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UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON:* THE SECOND
CIRCUIT OVERCOMES THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES' MYOPIC VIEW OF "NOT ORDINARILY
RELEVANT" FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
CRIMINAL OFFENDER
Karen R. Smith**
INTRODUCTION
A federal judge faced with the weighty task of sentencing
a criminal defendant must consider recommendations from
diverse competing quarters. Prosecutors, defense counsel and
probation officers dissect the offender's past transgressions;
each of them lobbies for a sentence deemed "appropriate" in
light of the crime. To that end, the judge conscientiously sorts
out the circumstances of the particular crime and then attempts to sentence similarly situated offenders to similar
amounts of punishment. Yet, while such uniformity is appealing, it masks a troubling issue. Should the judicial determination of what is an "appropriate" sentence ever take into account the extraordinarily punitive impact a custody sentence
will have on the offender's family?
It might seem intuitive that a nonviolent, first-time offender, who is the sole financial and emotional support for her
family, should be eligible at least for a minimal sentence or
even probation. A federal judge, however, does not have unfettered discretion to fashion a sentence that responds humanely
to the parent-offender's family circumstances. A federal judge
must conform her sentencing practices to a series of recommended sentencing ranges promulgated by the Federal Sen-

" 964

F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. I am indebted to
my colleague Professor Myrna Raeder for her insightful comments. I also want to
acknowledge United States Probation and Parole Officers Maria McBride, Tony
Garoppolo, Christine Sutton and Nancy Reims for their generous assistance. A
special thanks goes to my research clerk, Susan Bliziotis, for her creativity, legal
analysis and commitment to this project.
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tencing Commission ("Commission").' Moreover, while a federal judge freely can reject the sentencing recommendations of
the prosecution, defense and probation department, that judge
cannot reject with impunity the Commission's promulgations.
Since the era of Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") began in 1987,2 federal district court judges have found
themselves in the unenviable position of having their sentencing practices monitored by both cautious appellate courts and
the formidable Commission. A paradox arises from the contradictory standards by which district court sentencing decisions
are now evaluated: sentencing decisions should not deviate unnecessarily from the restrictions imposed by the Guidelines,
yet sentencing decisions should explore unchartered areas
involving unique sentencing issues. While the Commission has
publicly welcomed the participation of district courts in developing and refining acceptable sentencing practices, this participation is hardly a partnership.8 A district court judge may
feel encouraged to explore the outer boundaries of the new
Guidelines' frontiers, yet simultaneously feel constrained by
the Guidelines' choke collar. Not surprisingly, the "lead but
follow" directive from the Commission to the federal judiciary
has been confusing. While many district court judges pick their
The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the
judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting ex officio members.
At least three members must be federal judges and all members serve six-year
terms.
2 This era began in 1984 with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984,'Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-86 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
' The Commission has extended an invitation in the following manner: "Accordingly, the Commission refines and modifies the [G]uidelines in light of the
district and appellate court consideration of the [Gluidelines research, congressional
enactment of new statutes, and input from federal criminal justice practitioners."
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1992).
The relationship between the district courts, appellate courts and the Commission has been described by Chief Justice Breyer of the First Circuit Court of Appeals as a partnership. United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993).
Chief Judge Breyer, a former Sentencing Commissioner, envisions the partnership
as one "in which each partner enjoys a different institutional strength." Id. at 950.
Chief Judge Breyer's partnership model, however, is more aspirational than real.
As this Article will demonstrate, the appellate courts, including the First Circuit,
have often reversed district court departure findings despite the district courts'
superior sentencing vantage point and experience in forming a "judgment as to
when certain kinds of circumstances seem better handled by judicial discretion and
how courts ought to exercise that discretion." Id.
1
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way through the Guidelines' sentencing thicket with great
caution, others who preside in urban areas have embraced the
evolving area of downward departures from the applicable
Guidelines range with fervor.' Indeed, trail-blazing Guidelines
interpretation by district courts has created a downward departure jurisprudence which courts of appeal and, more particularly, the Second Circuit has upheld whole-heartedly.'

Senior Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court Eastern
for the District of New York has been both critical of and creative with the Guidelines structure. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 6 (1992) [hereinafter Weinstein, Trial Judge's Reflections]; Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's First
Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Weinstein, First Impression]. Judge Weinstein has authored numerous opinions which place him in the forefront of the evolving downward departure jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(defendant's actual, not hypothetical, state of mind must be carefully determined
at sentencing when applying drug quantity provisions under the Guidelines); United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (downward departure
granted based upon culturally instilled subservience and physical abuse); United
States v. McGee, 802 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (downward departure warranted because of defendant's responsibility for the welfare of child in her custody);
United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (downward departure
based upon combination of defendant's near retardation, vulnerability and efforts
at rehabilitation); United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (downward departure for potential permanent loss of custody of children);
United States v. Stoflberg, 782 F. Supp. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting § 5K2.0
departure based upon substantial assistance to Congress and request for consideration by Chief Counsel of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives); United States v. Agu, 763 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (downward
departure based upon likelihood of deportation despite statutory right to citizenship for serving in United States armed forces); United States v. Velasquez, 762 F.
Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (downward departure based upon mitigating circumstance
of metastasized cancer).
A sampling of other district courts' innovative downward departure theories
that have developed in urban settings include: United States v. Hon, No. 89 CR
0052, 1989 WL 59613 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989) (downward departure appropriate
because Commission did not consider availability of extraordinary civil remedies
available to companies who are "victimized" by counterfeit goods). In United States
v. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1993), Judge J. Spencer Letts identified
defendant's assistance to his Probation Officer during the Los Angeles riots as an
event which "speaks to his tremendous character, and which deserves award in
sentencing. [The defendant] provided substantial assistance to authorities during
the riots, ensuring the personal safety of the Probation Officer. The Guidelines do
not adequately consider this type of assistance by defendants." Id. at 846.
See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) (district court
has power to depart downward where extreme increase in base offense-level occurred when the application of a cross reference provision in Guidelines raised
imprisonment range from 12-18 months to 210-262 months), petition for recert.
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Representative of this evolving jurisprudence is the 1992
Second Circuit case United States v. Johnson.6 In Johnson, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seized upon a tiny
toehold found in the language of policy statement U.S.S.G.
section 5H1.67 to scale a Guidelines barrier that tends to prevent judges from considering the consequences of sentencing
upon a defendant's family. The court upheld the downward
departure of ten levels, which the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Patterson, J.) had granted to the
defendant, Cynthia Johnson, based upon her "extraordinary"
family responsibilities.' A close inspection of the Johnson opinion, however, reveals that the Second Circuit has not yet defined with exactitude the criteria by which a defendant may
qualify for this elusive downward departure. Given the limited
leeway for sentencing innovation granted to federal courts by
the Commission, it may prove prudent for the Second Circuit
to be bold in its departure decisions but ambiguous in its reasoning to justify those departures. The factual particulars that
made Cynthia Johnson's parental situation seem "not ordinary" to the Second Circuit could have been rejected easily by
other circuits or, worse, repudiated by the vigilant Commission
through its Guidelines amendment process. As a result, accep-

filed, (U.S. June 23, 1993) (No. 92-9190); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d
Cir. 1991) (district court has authority to depart downward where defendant was
not aware of his involvement in a drug transaction until shortly before the incident and where incarceration in accordance with Guidelines might result in destruction of an otherwise strong family unit); United States v. Sharpsteen, 913
F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990) (remanded record for reconsideration because of ambiguous
of sentence concerning defendant's family ties and responsibilities); United States
v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990) (upheld downward departure based on finding
that defendant's vulnerability to victimization in prison presented an extraordinary
situation).
6 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
' The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.] § 5H1.6 (Policy Statement), entitled Family Ties and Responsibilities and
Community Ties states: "Family ties and responsibilities and community ties are
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range. Family responsibilities that are complied with may be
relevant to the determination of the amount of restitution or fine."
8 The district court in Johnson decreased the offense level by two levels because the crime was more accurately classified as a theft than a bribery. The
district court then subtracted one additional level because the proceeds of the
crime were shared with a co-defendant. Finally, the district court deducted ten
more levels because defendant Cynthia Johnson was "solely responsible for the
upbringing of four young children." Johnson, 964 F.2d at 126.
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tance or rejection of a downward departure may hinge more a
court's rhetoric than upon the factual particulars presented to
it. Thus, the true message of United States v. Johnson may
have been hidden between the lines by the Second Circuit.'
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the interaction between the Commission and the federal judiciary. Part II
then explores how the Second Circuit's approach to section
5H1.6 offender characteristics departures as expressed in
Johnson compares with previous Second Circuit decisions and
with those of other circuits. Finally, Part III examines the
critical role played by the federal probation officer who gathers
the background facts that ultimately may lead to a downward
departure. As this Article will explore, the theoretical framework of the Guidelines departure mechanism fails in practice if
the probation officer who prepares the presentence report cannot readily identify the criteria that form the basis for downward departures. Indeed, the absence of clear criteria in the
area of family ties and responsibilities places the presentence
writer in a quandary about how to differentiate between the
offender family circumstances considered "extraordinary" by
the Guidelines and those which are ordinary and, therefore,
irrelevant. This Article concludes with an evaluation of a residual question raised by the cryptic approach taken in Johnson:
if the Second Circuit is speaking in code in United States v.
Johnson as this Article suggests, will all interested parties be
able to decipher it?

" The federal judiciary clearly is wary of the power of the Commission to
eliminate judicially-created departures. The Commission views its relationship to
the judiciary in the following way: "By monitoring when courts depart from the
[G]uidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions
with references thereto, the commission, over time, will be able to refine the
[Gluidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be
permitted." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b).
This invitation is viewed with caution in some quarters but not in all. Judge
Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit observed, "In sum, there is abundant evidence that the Sentencing Commission is engaged in a dialogue with the courts
and frequently responds when judges depart or articulate their concerns about
their inability to depart. It is to be hoped that judges will continue to articulate
their concerns forthrightly and often." Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion
Available to the Sentencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, FED. PROBATION,
Dec. 1991, at 10, 12.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 59: 573

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN
UNEASY ALLIANCE

Prior to November 1987, district court judges enjoyed a
relatively unrestricted power to grant probation and to impose
custody sentences within the generous parameters of the maximum sentences affixed to statutes by Congress. While the
sentencing discretion exercised by a district court could be reviewed by appellate courts, great latitude and deference were
shown by appellate courts in upholding sentences imposed
within statutory limits.' ° Moreover, district court judges were
not required to reveal the reasoning supporting their sentences
and, in fact, risked reversal if a stated reason was later declared improper." With the advent of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 198412 and the concomitant creation of
10 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 49 (1978); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972). Prior to enactment of the Guidelines, sentencing
procedure had to comply with Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
FED. R. CRIML P. 32. Often pre-Guidelines case law focused upon the due process
aspects of notice to the defendant and the defendant's right to address the court
at sentencing. 'Even a defendant convicted of the most heinous crime ha[d] the
right to address the court prior to sentencing and thus apologize for or explain his
or her conduct." Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1525 n.2 (9th Cir.) (quoting
In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 297
(1992); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1975); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, summarized the pre-Guidelines discretion of federal sentencing
judges.
Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were based on concepts of the
offender's possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was
realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize
the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to society. It obviously required the judge and the parole officer to make their
respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of
the offender's amenability to rehabilitation ....
This led almost inevitably to the conclusion on the part of a reviewing court that the sentencing
judge "sees more and senses more" than the appellate court; thus, the
judge enjoyed the 'superiority of his nether position," for that court's
determination as to what sentence was appropriately met with virtually
unconditional deference on appeal.
Id. at 363-64.
" See U.S. v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985) (national origin of
defendant and the need to send a "message" held to be improper bases for sentences).
2 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3353 (1985)).
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the United States Sentencing Commission, district court judges
found their sentencing discretion greatly restricted and ultimately scrutinized by the equivalent of a "federal sentencing
review board" which reports to Congress. Since Congress and
not the judicial branch exercises actual control over the Commission, the Commission is in effect a judicial watchdog agency
that watches its nominal master.
The Commission was charged by Congress 3 with the task
of designing "guidelines" to provide "certainty and fairness" in
meeting the sentencing purposes of deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment and rehabilitation." 4 To this end, Congress
warned, the Guidelines should avoid "unwarranted sentencing
disparity" among offenders with "similar characteristics convicted of similar criminal conduct." 5 The Commission was
also instructed to permit sufficient judicial flexibility to account for relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. 6 With
The constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. The Supreme Court held that Congress
had not violated the separation of powers doctrine by placing the Commission in
the judicial branch, where substantial decisions and judicial rulemaking have traditionally been carried out by judges. Additionally, "Congress's delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet
Constitutional requirements." Id. at 374. An inference may be drawn from the
holding in Mistretta that the Sentencing Commission is in effect, an autonomous
judicial agency. District courts and courts of appeal seemingly have drawn that
same conclusion following Mistretta and have adapted their sentencing practices to
the Guidelines' structure with varying degrees of success. A recurring criticism is
that the majority of courts of appeal do not challenge the applicability of the
Guidelines to the sentencing decisions made by the lower courts. In Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, Daniel J. Freed chastised the acquiescence exhibited by the courts of
appeal:
Many appeals court judges have adapted a strict enforcement approach,
holding district courts accountable to unquestioned guidelines, but not
holding the commission and its guidelines accountable to the [Sentencing
Reform Act]... . Courts of appeals have acted more like super-sentencing commissions. They have assumed the role of protectors and elaborators of the guidelines, rather than the role of sentence reviewers, who, as
18 U.S.C. § 3742 suggests, defer to the knowledge and firsthand experience of the sentencing judge.
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1747 (1992).
14 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A2.
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
' Theoretically, meting out just punishment is also a goal of the Sentencing
Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1988). As United States Sentencing
Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel commented,
while every effort was made to treat like offenders alike, less attention
3
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these objectives in mind, the Commission digested empirical
data gleaned from reviewing pre-Guidelines sentencing practices, as reflected in 10,000 presentence investigations performed
by the United States Parole Commission. 7 The Commission,
however, "did not simply copy estimates of pre-Guidelines
practice as revealed by the data."i" In fact, the Commission
intentionally modified the sentencing ranges to reflect the
sentencing philosophy preached by Congress instead of that
actually practiced by district courts.' 9 Thus, rather than simply codifying actual judicial sentencing practices into "the
Guidelines," the Commission consciously set out to accomplish
a degree of behavior modification regarding certain judicial
sentencing practices. The sentencing guidelines forged from
this process were submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987, and
became effective on November 1, 1987.20
The sentencing process as outlined by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 and formalized by the Commission's Guide-

was given in the first set of guidelines, partly because of time constraints, to the possibility of over or under-defining like offenders. That
is, the emphasis was more on making sentences alike, and less on insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar treatment.
Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 934 (1990). Federal judges, however, seemingly respond to those differences in offenders and look for Guideline avenues by which to individualize sentences to reflect these palpable differences.
x7U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A3, p.s.
Id. ch. 1, pt. A, intro, comment.
Areas of modification included departing from the prevalent judicial practice
of "punishing economic crime less severely than other apparently equivalent behavior." The Commission also increased penalties for drug cases. Id. ch. 1, pt. A3, p.s.
As Daniel Freed noted:
in enacting the [Sentencing Reform Act], Congress clearly sought to increase to increase the level of imprisonment for certain crimes. It identified those crimes in [28 U.S.C. § 9941, instructing the Commission, for
example, to specify prison terms "at or near the maximum" for career
offenders who commit crimes of violence or drug offenses, and to assure
'substantial' terms of imprisonment for other designated crimes. At the
same time, however, Congress also sought to reduce unnecessary imprisonment in other kinds of cases. First offenders were one explicit illustration ....
See Freed, supra note 13, at 1706.
20 The Commission modestly observed that these Guidelines are 'a practical
effort toward the achievement of a more honest, uniform, equitable proportional,
and therefore effective sentencing system." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A3, p.s. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines apply only to offenses committed on or after November 1,
1987. Id. ch. 1, pt. A, intro, comment. 5 (historical note).
"
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lines seeks to "rationalize the federal sentencing process."21
Such rationalization is achieved through reference to a sentencing matrix. The sentencing court is expected to identify
appropriate sentencing ranges (expressed in increments of
months) for any federal crime by referring to the Guidelines
Manual and its related Policy Statements and Commentary.2 2
Although labelled "Guidelines," this reference table and accompanying Policy Statements and Commentary have been more
mandatory than advisory in their application.
If a
defendant's case history contains sentencing factors that are
unusual, the sentencing court may impose a sentence at the
lower end of the range or may "depart" from Guidelines altogether and impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range.2 4
Such deviation, however, must be justified as Guidelines sentences, if appealed, might be reviewed by either prosecution or
defense. Sentencing outside the applicable Guidelines range

2 Id.

ch. 1,

pt. A3,

p.s. This rationalized

sentencing process was forged

through philosophical compromises. See Stephen J. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1 (1988).
2
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
It is often the thankless role of the circuit courts to remind the district
courts of the new sentencing limitations created by the Guidelines. As the Seventh
Circuit observed in vacating a sentence granting a downward departure apparently
based upon the defendant's employment record and family circumstances,
[tihere would have been no problem with the district judge's exercise of
his seasoned discretion were it not for the strictures imposed by the
[Gluidelines, but we cannot ignore them anymore than may the district
judge. But for the [Gluidelines, the sentence imposed by Judge Dillin
may have been the most understanding and thoughtful way to possibly
rehabilitrce the defendant and without unnecessary harm to his family,
but it crnnot be affirmed on the record now before us.
United State-, v. Eiselt, 988 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1993).
Congres- itself has contributed to the impression that the Guidelines era has
wrought harsh sentencing consequences. However, Congress passed laws creating
mandatory rr inimum sentences for drug offenses which have been incorporated into
the overall sentencing scheme by the Commission. As Judge William W. Schwarzer
noted, "man'atory minimum sentencing statutes operate concurrently with the
[G]uidelines and, indeed, formed the basis for the Commission's [G]uidelines for
drug-related offenses. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of mandatory
minimum statutes from those of the sentencing [G]uidelines." William W.
Schv.rarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and
Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 405, 405 (1992).
" "The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each [Gluideline as
carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each
guideline describes." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b).
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will not be reviewed on appeal, however, if such deviation is
agreed to by the prosecution and defense.2 5
Given the weighty task of applying the appropriate guidelines to each defendant's situation, a sentencing court must
rely upon the objective factual investigation performed by the
United States Probation Office. Clearly, the sentencing court
may not search out the operative Guidelines sentencing facts
on its own, nor may it rely exclusively upon the biased advocacy of a prosecutor or defense attorney. The court relies upon
the Probation Office to prepare an objective and complete presentence investigation report. Yet even the arguably objective
presentence report may not fully reflect information crucial to
a Guidelines sentencing decision.2" Roadblocks may be placed
25 While an agreement can be struck between prosecution and defense "off the
record," it is more likely that such an agreement will be formalized. Specifically,
motions by the government pursuant to § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) allow the
court to depart downward based upon a defendant's substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another. In 1992, the Commission tabulated reasons
given for downward departures by sentencing courts and found that 71.6% of them
were awarded for "substantial assistance." 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at
125.
The downward departure for substantial assistance can create a frustrating
and troubling sentencing disparity in drug conspiracy cases. Often the lowly "mule"
defendant who has gained the least from the drug activity also knows the least
and cannot provide substantial assistance to the government. As a result, higherranking drug lieutenants or chiefs may receive lower Guidelines sentences than
the arguably less culpable mules because of downward departures granted under §
5K1.1.
Thus if all participants-judge, prosecutor and defense counsel-ignore the
prescribed Guidelines range and bestow a charitable sentence upon a sympathetic
defendant, such benevolent collusion can produce well-meaning yet disparate sentencing patterns in spite of the Guidelines. This perception of disparity arises
because the offense conduct and offender characteristics of different defendants
appear so similar that a difference in sentencing result cannot be explained within
the Guidelines structure. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 762 F. Supp. 39
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Government agreed not to contest a court ruling that defendant's
cancer was a "mitigating circumstance" where a defendant conspired to possess
with intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of cocaine and faced 151 to 188
months in prison. The defendant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment).
26 The difficulty in getting the actual case facts has been noted by commentators. As Senior Eighth Circuit Judge Heaney stated, "The prosecutor controls the
flow of information about the offense to the probation office, which prepares the
presentence investigation report and recommends the sentencing range. I cannot
over-emphasize this point: probation officers simply do not have the resources to
independently investigate the cases assigned to them. Consequently, the prosecutor
controls the sentencing information that the probation office compiles in the presentence investigation report." Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating
Guidelines Sentencing, 29 Ai. CRII. L. REV. 771, 776-77 (1992).
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by the joint efforts of prosecutors and defense counsel who
contrive to sanitize stipulated facts about a defendant's criminal conduct in order to minimize the Guidelines' impact."
Similarly, roadblocks may be placed by the Guidelines' investigative structure because of its lack of emphasis on ferreting
out bases for downward departures. Without question, the
presentence investigation and the facts determined through
that process have a far-reaching impact upon the Guidelines'
ultimate objective of eliminating unwarranted sentencing dis28

parity.

Sentencing practices that do occur within the radar range
of the Commission are reviewed and tabulated. 29 The Commission modifies the Guidelines based upon its evaluation of
the sentencing results. As the Commission has observed, "by
monitoring when courts depart from the [G]uidelines and by
analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions
with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be
able to refine the [Gluidelines to specify more precisely when
departures should and should not be permitted."" The
Commission's Guidelines amendment power 3' is a swift mech27 The issue of how to blunt the impact of the "relevant conduct" guideline

provision often motivates defense counsel to engage in active plea negotiation.
Guidelines § 1B1.3 permits sentencing courts to consider a defendant's uncharged
misconduct even though the misconduct is not part of either the factual basis to a
Rule 11 guilty plea or presented to a jury. Daniel J. Freed observed that the issue
of relevant conduct
exacerbate[s] discrimination between well-represented defendants, for
whom a careful bargain fixes the parameters for a predictable sentence,
and less fortunate defendants who inadequately represented, enter an
untutored plea unaware of the relevant conduct consequences that may
follow.
Ironically, the relevant conduct guidelines reduces visibility and candor in sentencing. It signifies that facts presented to the judge or jury do
not place guidelines boundaries on the sentence, and that the rules governing how far relevant conduct may be stretched are in fact leading
sophisticated practitioners to bargain over how much unadjudicated information will be withheld from the court.
Freed, supra note 13, at 1714-15.
28 See infra Section III.
27 The Commission has published Annual Reports for the years 1989-1992 in
addition to other special reports. The Report implements the congressional directive periodically to "review and revise, in consideration of comments and data
coming to its attention, the [Gluidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of
this section." 28 USC § 994(o) (1988).
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.
3, The Commission sends its proposed amendments to Congress annually on or
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anism, used to refine and reshape Guidelines sentencing practices." An edifying example of how the Commission routes
out Guidelines heresy is the history of Policy Statement section
5H1.12, an amendment made effective November 1, 1992.
Section 5H1.12 states that "lack of guidance as a youth and
similar circumstance indicating a disadvantaged upbringing
are not relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the
applicable [G]uidelines range."33

after the beginning of a regular session of Congress, but not later than the first
day of May. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). Such Guidelines amendments become effective
automatically after the expiration of a 180-day Congressional review period or at a
later date set by the Commission, unless Congress provides otherwise by law. 28
U.S.C. § 994. In 1992, 36 amendments proposed by the Commission became effective November 1, 1992. On April 29, 1993, the Commission submitted twenty-two
amendments to Congress. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg.
27, 148 (1993).
32 In fact, in Braxton v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991), the Supreme
Court avoided intervening in inter-circuit conflicts over the meaning of a proviso
within § 1B1.2(a) of the Guidelines Manual "because the [Sentencing] Commission
had already undertaken [an amendment] proceeding [to] eliminate circuit conflict
over the meaning of § 1B1.2(a)." Id. at 1858. The Supreme Court clarified that it
is the Commission's role to eliminate conflicts among the circuits with respect to
the interpretation of the Guidelines. Id. at 1857-58.
3 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12, p.s. Undeniably § 5111.12 was promulgated in May 1992
to eliminate the recent Ninth Circuit Guidelines precedent established in United
States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991). In Floyd, the district court based
its novel departure theory on the fact that most of the defendant's prior offenses,
which placed him in a high criminal history Guidelines range, were attributable to
his youth. This basis for departure was upheld by the sympathetic Ninth Circuit
panel, which then fashioned a "youthful lack of guidance" basis for departure-a
basis that had not been reflected in the Guidelines. The youthful lack of guidance
approach of the Floyd decision has been criticized. Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain
Uncertainty:Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guideline, 66 U.S.C. L. REV. 621,
655 (1992); see also United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65-69 (2d Cir. 1993)
("While we express-as did the district court-sympathy for their families, we are
unable to protect youthful lack of guidance generally as a reason for downward
departure, particularly, in the instant case where its elements were not present.").
The Commission, however, eradicated this deviant departure theory within one
year of its formulation. The Commission offered a terse explanation for the abolition of this basis for downward departure. "Reason for Amendment: This amendment provides that the factors specified are not appropriate grounds for departure." Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 20,160 (1992).
Consider Guidelines § 5H.11, in which the Commission undercut the downward departure granted by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Turner, 915 F.2d
1574 (6th Cir. 1990). Section 5111.11 states that "[mlilitary, civic, charitable, or
public service; employment-related contributions, and similar prior good works are
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 5111.11, p.s. (effective Nov. 1, 1991). The
Commission gave the following reason for the Amendment of § 5H1.11:
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The Supreme Court has manifested resistance to the task
of refereeing Guidelines-interpretation disputes, thereby leaving district and circuit courts with no forum in which to challenge the wisdom of the Commission's Guideline amendments.34 The Supreme Court recently underscored the

[tihis amendment expresses the Commission's intent that the factors set
forth a §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6 are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, but that
unless expressly stated, these policy statements do not mean that the
Commission views such factors as necessarily inappropriate to the determination of the sentence within the applicable guideline range. The language within these sections is revised for clarity and consistency.
Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,779 (1991).
In this same passage, the Commission included indirect comment on another
novel basis for departure developed in the Second Circuit: "[This amendment] sets
forth the Commission's position that physical appearance, including physique, is
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range." Id. at 22,780. It is noteworthy that in United States v.
Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990), Judge Cardamone, writing for the majority,
concluded that a downward departure was warranted because
it is plain that the Commission did not consider vulnerability to the
extent revealed in this record-where the only means for prison officials
to protect [the defendant] was to place him in solitary confinement.
Hence the peculiar vulnerability found by the district court was a circumstance not taken into account by the Commission.
Id. at 602. Judge Cardamone also stated that "to the extent the § 5H1 factors of
physical, mental and emotional condition were relied upon, such reliance was justified by the extraordinary situation faced by [the defendant]." Id. at 603.
The Lara court baited the Commission in somewhat flamboyant Second Circuit fashion by observing- "[tjhe [Guidelines] legislative history reflects that it was
not Congress' aim to straitjacket a sentencing court, compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines glass bubble, and preventing it from exercising discretion, flexibility or independent judgment." Id. at 604.
", While acknowledging that a principal purpose for granting certiorari is to
resolve inter-circuit conflicts over the meaning of federal law, the Supreme Court
in Braxton u. United States noted that the Court is not the "sole body that could
eliminate such conflicts. Congress itself can eliminate a conflict concerning a statutory provision by making a clarifying amendment to the statute, and agencies can
do the same with respect to regulations." Braxton v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1854, 1857 (1991). In Braxton, the Supreme Court paid great deference to the
Commission's congressionally granted authority to "decide whether and to what
extent its amendments reducing sentences will be given retroactive effect." Id. at
1858. Thus, the impression left by this language is that the Supreme Court will
not rush in to rectify Guidelines issues without allowing the Commission considerable time to sort out and settle Guidelines controversies.
Such "judicial restraint" leaves certain Supreme Court justices frustrated. In
dissenting to the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari in Kinder v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992), Justice White expressed his impatience with the
Court's refusal to address the Fifth Amendment implications of denial of acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 as it relates to uncharged conduct.
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Commission's supremacy in its power struggle with the federal
judiciary in Stinson v. United States. 5 In Stinson, the Court
clarified the weight and binding authority of the Policy Statements and Guidelines Commentaries promulgated by the Commission. The Court used Stinson as an opportunity to address
the Commission-judiciary detente by focusing on the narrow
issue of whether the Commentary accompanying the Guidelines had a binding effect upon a court's sentencing decision.
Speaking on behalf of the unanimous Stinson Court, Justice
Kennedy clearly marked off the boundaries of the
Commission's authority: "We decide that commentary in the
Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a Guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a Federal
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading
of that Guideline." 6 Adding a pinch of salt to an open wound,
the Court argued that

Amendments to this Guideline have not amended the split between the
circuits. In any event, this is not a question of the mere application or
simple interpretation of this Guideline, but is instead a recurring issue of
constitutional dimension, where the varying conclusions of the Courts of
Appeals determines the length of sentence actually imposed. I would also
grant certiorari on this issue.
Id. at 2293 (citation omitted).
Interestingly, on May 11, 1992, the Commission proposed an amendment to §
3E1.1 which allowed for one additional level reduction for acceptance of responsibility when defendant has provided assistance to the government in investigating
her/his own misconduct. The amendment proposed replacing "offense and related
conduct," which has been found to cause confusion, with the term "offense," and
provides guidance as to the meaning of this term in the context of the guideline.
It therefore appears that the Commission has addressed in some way the conflict
over acceptance of responsibility for uncharged conduct.
By the same token, the Supreme Court has not completely withdrawn from
Guidelines clarifications as it granted certiorari and decided two cases with Guidelines implications during the 1992-1993 term. In United States v. Dunnigan, 113
S. Ct. 1111 (1993), a unanimous Court held that § 3C1.1, permitting a sentencing
enhancement for a defendant's peijury at trial, was constitutional because such an
enhancement "is consistent with our precedents and is not in contravention of the
privilege of an accused to testify in her own behalf." Id. at 1119. Similarly, in
Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993), the Supreme Court decided the
meaning of the phrase "use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1). "In fact, if we entertain for the
moment the dubious assumption that the Sentencing Guidelines are relevant in
the present context, they support [the majority's position]." Id. at 2055.
3 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).
3 Id. at 1914. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that Policy Statements
are binding. See Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1119 (1992).
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the commentary be treated as an agency's interpretation of its own
legislative rule.... The functional purpose of commentary (of the
kind at issue here) is to assist in the interpretation and application
of [the equivalent of legislative] rules, which are within the
Commission's particular area of concern and expertise and which
the Commission itself has the first responsibility to formulate and
announce. 37

The result in Stinson clashes with the position taken by
the Second Circuit, which has championed diminution of the
reliance on Guidelines, Policy Statements and Commentary in
sentencing. As recently as February 1993, the Second Circuit
in United States v. Merritt" dismissed the Commission policy
statements as merely "hortatory or explanatory, rather than
imperative. Policy Statements are not subject to formal legislative review and are not promulgated in compliance with the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, and, accordingly, they do not have the same degree of lawful authority as a
guideline."3 9 Yet the position ultimately taken by the Stinson
Court in May 1993 regarding the significance of Guidelines
Commentary leaves little doubt that Guidelines Policy Statements can no longer be dismissed as readily as the Second
Circuit had urged.
Therefore, after Stinson, the federal judiciary finds itself
bound by Guidelines Policy Statements and Commentary
which it does not generate and cannot appeal. While some
commentators agitate for a more discriminating scrutiny of the
applicability of the Guidelines,40 others exhort mastery of the
Guidelines' "unguided" departure mechanism.4 1 The Second
Circuit decision in United States v. Johnson4 is an example of
the latter approach which, as the next section of this Article

Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919.
38988 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1308.
4'See Freed, supra note 13, at 1746 ("[T]he themes of Commission accountability, sentencer flexibility, and a statutory duty to depart offer abundant opportunities for district courts to take affirmative action to sentence justly and depart from
flawed guidance."); see also Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 413 (1992).
41 Gerald Bard TIjoflat, The Untapped Potential for Judicial Discretion Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Advice for Counsel, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991,
"

at 4; see Becker, supra note 9, at 10.
412 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
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suggests, has not been replicated throughout the other circuits.

II. UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON: A WAYSTATION ON THE
SECOND CIRCUIT'S EXCELLENT ADVENTURE IN DOWNWARD

DEPARTURES BASED UPON "NOT ORDINARILY RELEVANT"
OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS

A.

The Guidelines and Downward Departures

While the Commission formulated "simple," workable
guidelines covering all federal crimes, 4" it also recognized that
the individuals who commit these crimes do so in markedly
different ways. More importantly, a sentencing judge has direct
contact with a human being, as opposed to a mere sentencing
statistic." Consequently, the Commission itself noted that "it
is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompass the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a
sentencing decision."4 5 Therefore, the Commission included
departure mechanisms within the operation of its Guidelines to
accommodate varying sentencing factors. These departures are
characterized as either "guided" or "unguided," depending upon
whether the Commission anticipated the factual variables and
commented on them in the Guidelines. These variables can
increase or decrease punishment for the basic offense. Thus,
guided departures consist of factual variables surrounding the
commission of the crime that are spelled out in the Guidelines
(e.g., an upward departure is possible for bank robbery involving a high speed chase or a loaded weapon).46 "Unguided departures" may be premised upon either any factual variables
' The Guidelines are "simple" only in the sense that the sentencing matrix
involves only 43 offense levels and 6 criminal history categories. The Commission
deliberately sought "workability" as a Guidelines goal, because a "sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of each case would quickly become
unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent effect." U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A3.
" As Judge Jack B. Weinstein observed, "[Miost find it extremely difficult to
look into the eye of another human being and punish him or her severely, particularly when the family is standing by, about to suffer more than the defendant."
First Impression, supra note 4, at 10.
Weinstein,
41 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b).
" For example, the Commentary to § 2G1.1 (Transportationfor the Purpose of
Prostitution or Prohibited Sexual Conduct) recommends a downward departure of
eight levels where the criminal conduct did not involve a commercial purpose. Id.
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not expressly defined in the Guidelines or any departure
grounds mentioned but not considered adequately by the Commission." Sentencing courts, in searching out relevant sentencing facts that qualify as a basis for departing from the
applicable Guidelines range, need only avoid sentencing factors
that the Commission has removed from consideration such as
race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion and socio-economic
48
status.
Downward departure jurisprudence is the collective body
of sentencing decisions under the Guidelines in which downward departures have been granted. In 1992 there were 141
downward departures granted for family ties and responsibilities, constituting 1.8% of the 7653 reported downward departures.49 The greatest number of downward departures, 5478
(71.6%), were granted for a defendant's substantial assistance
in the prosecution of others, while 607 downward departures
(7.9%) resulted from plea agreements. This disproportionately
high percentage of downward departures based upon a
defendant's willingness to cooperate with government agencies
has been constant throughout the Guidelines era50 and lends
support to criticism that acute sentence disparity remains
despite the Guidelines sentencing process.5 1 The Commission
'7

U.S.S.G. § 5K2, p.s.

Id. § 5H1.10, p.s.
" This number reflects an increase over the 110 downward departures (representing 2% of all departures) granted in 1991. In 1990 there were 38 cases (3.8%)
of downward departures. See 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 125 (Table
48

49); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 137 (Table 53); U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 72 (Table R).
'0 See 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 125 (Table 49); 1991 ANNUAL

REPORT, supra note 52, at 137 (Table 53); 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52, at
72 (Table R).
5" In summarizing their research findings concerning the impact of plea bargaining and substantial assistance motions by government prosecutors in three
different cities, Professors Nagel and Schulhofer observed:
The principal problem with guideline circumvention is that circumvention,
unlike overt downward departure, is hidden and unsystematic. It occurs
in a context that forecloses oversight and obscures accountability...
Substantively, the kind of circumvention we have studied and identified
is simply a covert vehicle for downward departure. As with other departures, the resulting sentence may be appropriate or inappropriate, justified or unjustified.
Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 557 (1992).
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Table for 1992 also shows that 266 (3.5%) of downward departures granted by district courts were for "general mitigating
circumstances," and that 343 cases (4.5%) of downward departures were for undisclosed "other" reasons.5 2 Although district
courts have used the departure mechanisms to varying degrees, the Second Circuit has embraced the unguided downward departure with considerable enthusiasm. It consistently
has granted downward departures from applicable Guidelines
ranges for reasons other than substantial assistance to the
government. When the downward departure practices of all the
circuits are compared, the Second Circuit ranks second only to
the Ninth Circuit in granting downward departure motions for
non-substantial assistance reasons.5 3 While the Second and
Ninth Circuits are in the forefront of exploring the Guidelines
departure frontier, these circuits do not share the same departure philosophies. 4 A primary area of divergence between the
downward departure jurisprudence of the Ninth and Second
Circuits is highlighted by the Second Circuit's decision in
Johnson.5 5 The following discussion explores the Johnson

The danger of circumvention through the "covert" substantial assistance departure is that it can be arbitrary and based upon personality quirks. The "value"
of one's assistance is measured exclusively by the prosecutor from whom the defendant seeks the requisite § 5K1.1 motion. Moreover, a defendant must "perform"
in order to have his or her assistance weighed and measured by the prosecutor. A
less than enthusiastic appraisal of the cooperating defendant's efforts can result in
no § 5K1.1 motion from the government despite the defendant's performance of his
or her end of the bargain.
" The Commission places the caveat on the number tabulation that the cases
reflected in the table are those for which reports on the sentencing hearing were
available. Each year there are a number of cases (e.g., 62 in 1992), for which the
sentencing court fails to state reasons for the departure.
"3 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, 127-29 (Table 50). The Ninth Circuit
granted 755 (12.2%) of its downward departures for reasons other than substantial
assistance in 1992 whereas the Second Circuit granted 263 (8.9%) of its downward
departures for bases other than substantial assistance. Id.
"' The Ninth Circuit has developed a downward departure jurisprudence keenly
receptive to a defendant's demonstration of unusual personal characteristics, especially when a defendant has been victimized. Thus the Ninth Circuit has upheld
departures for aberrant criminal behavior based upon a defendant's entire life,
United States v. Fairless, 975 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Takai,
930 F.2d 1427, 1434 (9th Cir.), superseded by, 941 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1991), extraordinary childhood abuse, United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1992),
or a unique combination of factors, United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1991).
" 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991).

1993]

NOT ORDINARILY RELEVANT

opinion, its consistency with Second Circuit precedent such as
United States v. Alba 6 and United States v. Sharpsteen"
and how the Johnson approach is antithetical to that taken by
the Ninth Circuit in similar factual settings."
B.

United States v. Johnson

In December 1990, the government charged Cynthia Johnson along with her co-worker, Cheryl Purvis, with one count of
conspiracy, nine counts of bribery and fourteen counts of theft
of public monies."9 These charges arose out of Johnson's and
Purvis's activities as payroll clerks at the Department of Veterans Affairs Hospital in New York.6" Johnson and Purvis devised a scheme to inflate paychecks and take "kickbacks" from
other hospital workers who benefitted from the inflated paychecks.6 1 Ms. Purvis, who masterminded the scheme, mentioned her successful plan and ultimately solicited Ms.
Johnson's and another clerk's participation in it.62 Within a
short period of time, Johnson and Purvis had recruited other
workers and demanded a percentage of the inflated payroll
checks.63 This scheme lasted fifteen months, during which 100
unauthorized pay adjustments were made, resulting in more
than $154,000 in illegal over-payments.'
E6 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
55 913 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990).
" The Ninth Circuit has been remarkably conservative in interpreting § 5H1.6
in light of its more creative approach to downward departures in general. In United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1991), the court seemed satisfied that '[tihe Commission considered family ties, was aware that those ties could
be affected by prison sentences, and declared that family ties ordinarily should not
be a factor in departing from Guideline Sentences." The Ninth Circuit's chilly
response to this downward departure theory makes it ill-advised to pursue it in
that circuit, especially when other downward departure theories are more warmly
received. See cases cited supra notes 55, 56 & 57.
9 United States v. Purvis, 762 F. Supp. 535, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
ro Id.
61 Id.
62 United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1992).
Purvis, 762 F. Supp. at 537.
64 Brief for Appellant U.S. at 3-6 (Statement of Facts), Johnson, 964 F.2d at
124 (Nos. 91-1515(L), 1541) [hereinafter Appellants Brief]. It should be noted that
appellee Johnson contradicts the loss attributable to this scheme, setting the figure
at $89,222. Brief for Appellee at 3, Johnson, 964 F.2d at 124 (No. 91-1515(L),
1541) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]. The Second Circuit adopted the appellee's
figure. See Johnson, 964 F.2d at 126.
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The government engaged in pretrial negotiations with
thirteen of the employees who had participated and benefitted
from the scheme.6 5 Before the indictment was filed against
Johnson in December 1990, the government filed a criminal
complaint against Purvis and Johnson charging them with
theft pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 641.66 Cynthia Johnson,
who was pregnant at that time with her sixth child, offered to
testify against co-defendant Purvis.6 7 The government rebuffed her offer, refusing to extend the section 5K1.1 requisite
substantial assistance downward departure motion to her under any circumstances." The December 1990 indictment that
was subsequently filed contained a new count of bribery.69
Neither Cynthia Johnson nor Cheryl Purvis testified at the
trial; following a nine day jury trial, both were convicted of all

" Appellee's Brief at 6. In the brief filed with the Second Circuit in Johnson,
Appellee detailed the preferential charging treatment afforded to other payroll
clerks and recipients of the stolen funds. Appellee cited two payroll clerks who
arguably were just like Purvis and Johnson, but were "granted deferred prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office, even though they shared in the stolen money,
[and] they could have stopped the scheme at the very start." Id. at 3. The United
States Attorney's office granted deferred prosecution to three others and referred
another co-venturer case to state authorities who declined prosecution. Misdemeanor pleas were offered to five other employees who received from $5813 to $16,194
in the scheme. Each one ultimately received a sentence of probation. Two others
were prosecuted by way of felony information which, Appellee's counsel asserted,
did not contain the dollar amounts actually stolen by these co-conspirators. Both
received probation sentences. Appellee's counsel also noted that the government did
make § 5K1.1 motions on behalf of the seven co-workers who had agreed to testify
for the government. Id.
6 Johnson, 964 F.2d at 126 (referring to the district court opinion).
6Id.

6 Appellant, the government, took great exception to the contention that it had
"improperly rejected" Johnson's offer to cooperate and withheld a § 5K1.1 motion.
The prosecutor defended its position arguing that the district court had found that
"the culpability of Johnson and Purvis vastly exceeded that of the other Hospital
workers." Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Johnson (Nos. 91-1515(L), 1541). Citing
the great difference between Johnson's and Purvis's culpability and that of the
other hospital workers, the Government extended deferred prosecution agreements
to those who received less than a certain monetary amount. The prosecutor also
observed that even the other seven hospital workers who were prosecuted faced
lower sentencing even before their co-operation was taken into account. Id.
The government unequivocally denied that it had arbitrarily refused Johnson's
cooperation, advancing as its justification her lack of candor because she claimed
"to be ignorant of the conspiracy until the spring of 1990," some three months
later than the government believed she in fact knew of it. Id.
69 Id. at 5.
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counts presented to the jury.7" Cynthia Johnson appeared for
sentencing before Judge Robert P. Patterson on August 19,
1991, following the preparation of a presentence investigative
report ("PSR") by the Probation Department. The PSR determined that Johnson's criminal conduct and history implicated
an offense level of 23 and criminal history category 1, a Guidelines range of forty-six to fifty-seven months.7 ' The PSR, however, did not recommend any departure from the forty-six to
fifty-seven month Guidelines range applicable to level 23.72
Judge Patterson, over defense objection, adopted the calculation in the PSR and arrived at a base offense level of 23. 7'
The district court then utilized the Guidelines' downward departure mechanism and arrived at a 13-level reduction in the
offense level.74 Over government objection, Judge Patterson
found that Johnson's crime "more closely resembled theft than
bribery" and, thus, subtracted two levels.75 The court deducted one more level because the proceeds of the crime were
shared with Purvis. The court then departed 10 levels because
Cynthia Johnson's family circumstances were "not ordinary.""
Judge Patterson made the following findings in support of his
departure decision:
The defendant is a single mother ....Her [institutionalized] daughter, age 21 is ... the mother of a six-year old child who currently
resides with the defendant. Also residing with the defendant in
Florida is her son, Lamont, and two children aged six and five, as
well as her youngest child, who is five months old. The father of this
child is unemployed and resides in Queens, New York .... There
are no signs of use [of] drugs or alcohol, and she [Johnson] apparently has no mental or emotional health problems."7

The court sentenced Cynthia Johnson to six months of home
70 Id. at 1-7.
71 PSI
44, PSI Addendum at 1.
72 Appellant's Brief at 7-8. The government noted in its brief that the base

level of 10, the PSI added 2 levels for more than one bribe and 5 levels for receiving bribes totalling over $40,000. Four additional levels were added for
Johnson's role as a leader and organizer. In an addendum to the PSI, the Probation Office also added a two-point adjustment because Johnson had instructed hospital employees not to cooperate.
"' Johnson, 964 F.2d at 126 (referring to the district court opinion).
74 Id. at 125.
75 Id.
76

Id.

7 Id.
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detention followed by three years of supervised release, and
ordered her to pay restitution of $27,973.8
The district court again noted Cynthia Johnson's family
circumstances at the sentencing of co-defendant Purvis on
August 27, 1991. Although the PSR also had recommended a
forty-six to fifty-seven month Guidelines range, the district
court did not impose the 2 point obstruction or impeding the
administration of justice adjustment as he had in Johnson's
case, but instead departed 3 offense levels and sentenced
Purvis to twenty-seven months in custody, followed by two
years supervised release and restitution. 9 Judge Patterson
commented at Purvis' sentencing about the obviously different
treatment co-defendant Johnson had received. "I did feel that
those children being without a mother for an extended period
of time was a hardship on them, not on her, hardship on them,
and that was extraordinary grounds for departure.""0 Thus
the inescapable conclusion is that the primary difference between the sentences received by Purvis and Johnson was
Johnson's family circumstances. The difference in punishment
also begs the question of whether the sentencing court created
an unwarranted sentencing disparity by misapplying a downward departure mechanism. In short, did Cheryl Purvis receive
the brunt of the punishment for a crime that she and Cynthia
Johnson had committed together simply because Purvis alone
lacked family ties significant enough to spare her from prison?"'
The government appealed the 13-level downward departure in Johnson and the Second Circuit rose to the Guidelines
challenge.82 Setting the tone for the reasoning that would fol78 Id.
7' Appellant's Brief at 10-11; U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

" Johnson, 964 F.2d at 130.
The co-defendant's situation in Johnson presents a most troubling departure
issue, as it involves similarly situated defendants. If Johnson is viewed alone, the
departure might seem reasonable in light of her family responsibilities. If Johnson
is viewed next to Purvis, the grant of a downward departure to Johnson seems to
be a sentencing windfall.
Ilene H. Nagel expressed concern about the danger of excessive judicial departures: "[t]he relevance of this to the disparity issue is that to the extent that the
may reappear; in this manifestation,
departure provision is abused, disparity ...
both uniformity and proportionality would be compromised." Nagel, supra note 16,
at 939.
8

82 964 F.2d at 128.
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low, Chief Judge Oakes, writing for Judges Cardamone and
Pierce, began the opinion in a provocative way:
The United States Sentencing Guidelines do not require a judge to
leave compassion and common sense at the door to the courtroom.
The government asks us, on this appeal, to reverse a sentencing
judge's exercise of downward flexibility on behalf of an infant and
three young children who depend entirely upon the defendant for
their upbringing.'

Although the lenient result ultimately reached in Johnson was
clearly foreshadowed by the language of the very first sentence
of the opinion, the Second Circuit nonetheless grappled with,
rather than ignored, the overarching Guidelines structure. The
court first addressed the weight and significance of section
5H1.6, which, the government asserted on appeal, precluded a
downward departure on the basis of family circumstances
alone." The court noted that although the Policy Statements
embodied in section 5H1.6 cannot be dismissed out of hand,
they are meant simply to aid courts, and that courts must not
give such statements undue weight. 5 The court reasoned,
moreover, that "courts must carefully distinguish between the
Sentencing Guidelines and the policy statements which accompany them and employ policy statements as interpretive guides
to, not substitutes for, the Guidelines themselves." 6 Having
indulged in an expression of disdain at being bound by Policy
Statements promulgated by an agency but not necessarily
submitted to and ratified by Congress itself," the court focused on 18 U.S.C. section 3553(b) and its relationship to

91 Id. at 124-25.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
86 Id.
' This

attack upon the legitimacy of Policy Statements should be reviewed in
light of the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements in Stinson v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993). The Johnson court based its attack on policy statements
upon the support found in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 815 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[We] must be mindful of the
limited authority of the commentary, because the commentary is never officially
passed upon by Congress."), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993). This distinction is
one that the Supreme Court itself ignored. But see Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919
("amended commentary is binding on the federal courts even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that satisfies
the standard set forth today").
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U.S.S.G. Policy Statement section 5H1.6. The court conceded
that policy statement section 5H1.6 demonstrates that the
Commission "took ordinary family responsibilities into account
when formulating the Guidelines." In a telling passage describing what the court viewed as "ordinary family responsibilities,"
the Johnson court commented:
The Sentencing Commission understood that many defendants
shoulder responsibilities to their families, their employers, and their
communities. Disruption of the defendant's life, and the concomitant
difficulties of those who depend on the defendant, are inherent in
the punishment of incarceration. The Commission made this clear
by explaining that such disruption of the defendant's exercise of
responsibility, as a general matter, should not be cause for downward departure ....

The critical word characterizing the "ordinary" consequences of
incarceration is the predictable "disruption" of the normal routines of family and work obligations. In addition to "disruption," the Johnson court distinguished "ordinary" from other
noteworthy circumstances: "[T]he Commission, in formulating
the Guidelines, was aware that incarceration may undermine
family responsibilities." 9 Thus, while "disrupting" and "undermining" the family unit constitutes the "ordinary" consequences of incarceration, the Johnson court nevertheless concluded that "[s]ection 5H1.6's phrasing confirms that the
commission's understanding that ordinary family circumstances do not justify departure but extraordinary family circumstances may." '
The Johnson court structured its defense of the district
court's downward departure decision around the "extraordinary" nature of Cynthia Johnson's family circumstances and
Second Circuit precedent acknowledging the existence of extraordinary family circumstances. That the district court arrived at this downward departure by assessing the impact of
964 F.2d at 128 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
'o Id. at 129 (citation omitted). This arguably false distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" family circumstance is troubling. The Guidelines prohibition against using "ordinary" family responsibilities as a grounds for departure
precludes only the ordinary, but neither explicitly nor implicitly demands the "extraordinary" to overcome the presumptive bar. Much like the logical paradigm of
"A" and "not A," the court seems to demand proof that in order to avoid "A," one
must prove "B," instead of proving that the phenomenon is "not-A."
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incarceration upon Johnson's immediate family was certainly
not lost on the Second Circuit. Chief Judge Oakes quoted the
sentencing court's obviously family-focused rationale:
In view of the special circumstances of the defendant-I shouldn't
say 'defendant,' I should say of the 'defendant's family,' which as the
court sees it, is a family in which the mother is the sole link between the children, the six-month old child... and having the father in Queens who does not contribute to the support of the fiveand six-year old children,.., having the father who does not contribute to their support, a 17 year-old boy having a father who does
not contribute to his support, and a six year-old grandchild whom
the mother is unable to keep because of the circumstances of her
having another child, at the age of 21, and living in an institution... I'm going to reduce the level.9'

Citing United States v. Alba,92 the Johnson court underscored
the similarities between defendait John Gonzalez's plight in
Alba and that of Cynthia Johnson.9 3 As will be demonstrated
shortly, however, the family structures in Alba and in Johnson
were certainly not identical.
C. Second CircuitPrecedent: United States v. Alba
In United States v. Alba, defendant John Gonzalez pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections
841(a)(1) and 846. After receiving a reduction for his minimal
role in the offense and for his acceptance of responsibility,
Gonzalez faced a Guidelines sentencing range of forty-one to
fifty-one months. The district court ultimately departed downward and sentenced Gonzalez to six months in a halfway
house, followed by two years of supervised release and fined
him fifty dollars.94 What swayed the district court to depart
downward-a decision that the Second Circuit ultimately up-

'1

Id. at 129-30.

933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991).
Johnson, 964 F.2d at 129. In Alba, 933 F.2d at 1117, the government appealed the sentencing factors applied to defendant John Gonzalez. The court of
appeals remanded for re-sentencing because it could not determine whether or not
the district court had relied upon the two proper grounds or the two improper
grounds for downward departure. Id. at 1118. Therefore the caption of the case is
"United States v. Alba" although the actual litigant was John Gonzalez.
" Alba, 933 F.2d at 1118.
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held on appeal-was Gonzalez's family situation. The Alba
court concluded: "the record amply supports the conclusion
95
that [Gonzalez's] family circumstances were extraordinary."
The "extraordinary circumstances" recognized by the court
were that:
Appellee has been married for 12 years. He, his wife and their two
daughters, aged four and 11, live with his disabled father-who
depends on Gonzalez to help him get in and out of his wheelchair-and his paternal grandmother. He had longstanding employment at the time of the events which gave rise to this case. He
worked two jobs to maintain his family's economic well-being, and
was aptly described as a man who works hard to provide for his
family. Clearly his is a close-knit family whose stability depends on
Gonzalez' continued presence." 8

The Second Circuit concluded that a downward departure,

under all the circumstances of Gonzalez's family, was not an
abuse of discretion. The Alba court observed that "the sentencing court had found that incarcerating Gonzalez in accordance
with the Guidelines might well result in the destruction of an
otherwise strong family unit and that circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary in this case to support a downward departure."97 Thus, the Second Circuit again focused upon the
destruction of a family unit, and not merely its disruption.
An evaluative standard such as "destruction of the family"
may well suffice as a meaningful way to distinguish "ordinary"
from "not ordinary" family circumstances and thereby assist
those who prepare PSRs and sentencing courts in sorting out
the meaning of section 5H1.6. 9' "Destruction" of the lives of
" Id.

at 1122.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
"
Some circuit courts interpret § 5H1.6 to mean that family responsibilities
are relevant in determining whether to impose restitution and fines. Courts following this approach assert that "unlike the guideline policy statement on departures
for substantial assistance, § 5H1.6 contains no language suggesting that this list is
merely illustrative rather than exhaustive. Section 5H1.6 contains no suggestions
that departures may be based on family considerations whenever they strike judges as particularly compelling." United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 530 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991). Other courts view departures from the
applicable guideline range appropriate in "extraordinary" cases. See United States
v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 167 (1992); United States v. Duarte, 901 F.2d
1498, (9th Cir. 1990).
The Second Circuit may be isolated in the extreme position it expressed in
96
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dependents is a threshold, albeit a very high one, that defendants can advance in the sentencing court, thereby providing
an avenue for consistency in treatment. A review of various
circuit courts' interpretations of section 5H1.6, however, reveals inconsistent treatment of offenders who seek downward
departures under that Guidelines provision. This inconsistency
is compounded by the fact that circuit courts infrequently supply an adequate description of the actual family circumstances
present in the record to support downward departure requests
by defendants. This paucity of detail may be a deficiency in the
lower court record or it may reflect a rhetorical device used by
circuit courts to make the family circumstances seem mundane. Nevertheless, the minimal factual description makes it
difficult to ferret out a set of factors that constitute "not ordinary" or "extraordinary" grounds for downward departure for
family responsibility or circumstances.
D. Section 5H1.6 and Other Circuits
The cases that greatly restrict the application of section
5H1.6 to rare family circumstances seem to view parent-child
separation due to incarceration as an "ordinary," if not a selfevident, fact of life. For example, in United States v.
9 the First Circuit reviewed the district court's refusChestna,"
al to grant a downward departure to May Lou Chestna despite
the "unique circumstances of her family responsibilities."0 0
The Chestna opinion described the defendant as a single mother who, at the time of sentencing, had three children ages thirteen, eleven and four. After sentencing, Ms. Chestna had her

United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2933 (1993):
Thus, the nearly total absence of categorization of offender characteristics
to be found in the Guidelines does not mean that the Commission sought
to overrule or disregard Congress' instruction that offender characteristics
should play a role of major significance in the determination of sentence . . . . Rather, the absence of Guideline's commands for defendant
characteristics represents the Commission's wise judgement that it is far
more difficult to quantify the effect that such characteristics should have
on individual sentences, than it is to prescribe relative values to a variety of offenses.
" 962 F.2d 103, 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 334 (1992).
I Id. at 104.
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fourth child. The court noted that "[aill of defendant's children
are being cared for by family members during defendant's
incarceration.""' The First Circuit characterized Chestna's
family circumstances (i.e., her "single parent" status and the
fact that she was the "mother of four") as unique, yet nevertheless declined to characterize her status as an "'idiosyncratic'
,102
circumstance, distinguishing her case from the 'mine-run. M
Similarly, in United States v. Mogel, the Eleventh Circuit described Darlene Mogel's situation as that of someone who "has
two minor children to support, and a mother that lives with
[her]. " "°3 The court nevertheless disallowed a downward de-

parture based upon such a showing.
Circuits that describe a defendant's situation as "single
parent status," but without focusing on the interrelationship of
child and parent, also tend to find such a situation to be "not
extraordinary" and, therefore, not worthy of a downward departure.0 4 These cases characteristically reason that single
parenthood is not unique. As the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Brand' observed:
A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today's society, and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the
children. It is apparent that in many cases the other parent may be
unable or unwilling to care for the children, and that the children
will have to live with relatives, friends, or even in foster homes ....
Although there doubtless are circumstances in which unique family
responsibilities might justify a downward departure, those circum-

Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 105 (referring to United States v. Aguilar-Pefia, 887 F.2d 347, 349-50
(1st Cir. 1989)). Interestingly, however, the First Circuit recently distinguished its
Chestna holding in United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993), and
remanded Rivera to the district court to consider a downward departure for the
single-mother defendant of three children under six years of age. The Rivera opinion, written by Chief Judge G. Breyer, a former United States Sentencing Commissioner, acknowledged that district courts have power to depart in unusual cases
where family circumstances are out of the ordinary and that such a determination
is entitled to deference on appeal. Id.
103 956 F.2d 1555, 1557 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 167 (1992). No other
information about Mogel's situation is presented in the opinion.
104 See United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Carr, 932 F.2d 67 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 112 (1991); United States v.
Headley 923 F.2d 1079 (3rd Cir. 1991); Mogel, 956 F.2d at 1555; United States v.
Johnson, 908 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1992) (superseded by statute as stated in United
States v. Manichio, 989 F.2d 438 (11th Cir. 1993)).
...907 F.2d 31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990).
101
102
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stances are not present here. Mrs. Brand's situation, though unfortunate, is simply not out of the ordinary."

Implicit in this holding is the premise that single parenthood
does not excuse one from the duty to provide for all contingencies such as debilitating illness, lengthy hospitalization, death
or even incarceration. Accordingly, having to provide for children does not render one's circumstances extraordinary.
Therefore the question "who will take care of my kids?" constitutes an "ordinary" routine concern which society expects a single parent to handle.
This judicial sentencing attitude masks a troubling disparity. Incarceration appears to wreak greater destructive consequences upon inmate mothers than upon inmate fathers. Statistical data strongly suggests that incarcerated mothers, as
opposed to fathers, rarely have the option of leaving their children with the other parent for caretaking."°7 Moreover, the
"single parent" cases have predominately involved female defendants. Perhaps this explains the difficulty district court
judges have resisting their instinct to grant lenient sentences
in such circumstances. Such leniency is often expressed by
departing to a Guidelines range where brief removal from the
home situation or restricted home detention are permissible."'5 In cases where the other parent will be present in the
,c Id. at 33.
1C7In a 1991 survey of inmates in Federal correctional facilities conducted by
the Bureau of Prisons [hereinafter "BOP"], there were 4222 women in BOP custody and 49,784 men. Of the inmates with children under 18 years of age, 90.5% of
the males' children lived with the other parent while only 33.3% of the female
inmates' children lived with their fathers. Additionally, 54% of the children of
inmates lived with grandparents, 36% lived with other relatives, 6.8% lived with
friends and 4.6% were in foster care.
"' The BOP has compiled sentences data in the area of gender and race that
bear on this issue. In 1992, downward departures for family ties and responsibilities were granted in 32 cases or .09% of all downward departures; for black males
in 7 cases or .04% of all downward departures; and for Hispanic males in 18
cases or 1.2% of all departures. On the other hand, white female offenders received downward departures for family ties and responsibilities in 34 cases or
5.1% of all downward departures; black females in 26 cases or 6.4% of all downward departures and Hispanic females in 16 cases or 6.3% of all downward departures.
These statistics are noteworthy because of the marked differences in percentages when viewed by gender, especially in light of the general reluctance to accept
family ties and responsibilities as a basis for downward departure outside the
Second Circuit. Professor Myrna Raeder discusses this gender disproportionality
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household while the convicted parent is incarcerated, courts
generally have been unresponsive to motions for downward
departure based on claims of extraordinary family responsibility."°9 For example, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Brewer"° and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Miller.' each
noted in passing that the female defendants had stable family
relationships and supportive spouses, making it easy for both
courts to deny downward departures."' Male defendants fare
no better pleading this departure basis while involved in intact
relationships."'
In contrast to the circuit decisions disallowing downward
departures pursuant to section 5H1.6, there are cases in which
such downward departures have been upheld. Characteristic of
this line of cases are opinions with strong positive conclusions
about the "extraordinary" nature of the family circumstances
described. Nevertheless, no mathematical formula regarding
the necessary number of dependents or degree of hardship
emerges as the unifying departure standard. In United States
v. Pefia,"' the Tenth Circuit upheld the downward departure
from a Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months imprisonment to
probation and six months in a community treatment center.
Irma Pefia, who had been found guilty of possession of less
than 50 kilograms of marijuana, was described as a

and its consequences in Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender Free World by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905 (1993).
10 The majority of circuits have viewed the pregnancy of the offender or the
infancy of the offender's dependent children as not ordinarily relevant for sentencing purposes beyond granting a stay pending the child's birth, see United States v.
Johnson, 908 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990), or staggering the surrender dates of
co-defendant parents in order to provide parental coverage for a four-year-old child,
United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991).
110899 F.2d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 1990).
.. 991 F.2d at 552 (9th Cir. 1993).
112 Notably both Brewer and Miller drew dissenting opinion from judges
who did
not accept the majority's contention that the psychological damage or dire consequences of removing mothers from young children was ever considered by the
Commission in formulating § 5H1.6.
...See United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990), and
reh'g denied, 498 U.S. 116 (1991); cf. United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d
Cir. 1991).
114 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1991).
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single parent of a two-month old child and... the sole support for
herself and her infant child. In addition, she has been steadily employed for a long time and is providing for the financial support of
her 16-year old daughter, who, herself, is a single parent of a twomonth old child. Therefore, should the defendant be incarcerated for
an extended period of time, two infants would be placed at a potential risk.l1 5

The court concluded that the district court had made the departure decision on proper grounds under the circumstances.
In United States v. Gaskill,"6 the Third Circuit held that
the district court had not appreciated the unusual circumstances before it and remanded the case for resentencing. Faced
with the delicate task of distinguishing Gaskill from the negative precedent established in United States v. Headley, which
involved a single-mother defendant, the Gaskill court noted
that Headley involved a situation in which the nature of the
crime produced "the applicable guidelines range [of] 17.5 years.
Thus, inevitably the children were destined to be consigned to
foster care even if the sentence were substantially reduced."117 The Gaskill court then detailed the compelling
nature of Gaskill's caretaking responsibilities for his mentally
disturbed elderly wife, portraying a life held together almost
exclusively by the dutiful defendant-husband: "All household
chores, other than cooking, are performed by the defendant
who also must administer her proper medication. She spends
sixteen hours a day in bed .... Dr. Houseknechtd described
the medication necessary to control flare-ups of Mrs. Gaskill's
condition and her total dependence on the defendant.""' The
court concluded that the record presented by Gaskill, who pled
guilty to fraudulent use of social security numbers, was "quite
out of the ordinary" because of, among other things,
the degree of care required for the defendant's wife, the lack of close

, Id. at 1494 (quoting district court opinion).
116991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993).
117 Id. at 85 (citing United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir.
1991)). The court also commented that in Headley, the defendant-mother was less
than an exemplary role model: "[Tihere would be some question whether the best
interests of the children would be served by allowing them to remain under the
care of the defendant who had exposed them to the atmosphere of large scale
drug dealings. In that case, family ties were not an appropriate bases for a downward departure." Id.
118Id.
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supervision by any family member other than the defendant, the
risk to the wife's well-being, the relatively brief-in one
sense-imprisonment sentence called for by the Guidelines computation, the lack of any end to be served by imprisonment other than
punishment, the lack of any threat to the community-indeed, the
benefit to it by allowing the defendant to care for his ailing
wife-are all factors that warrant departure.""'

While the Gaskill facts may appear "out of the ordinary,"
they are arguably no more so than those present in United
States v. Thomas,"' a 1991 Seventh Circuit case in which a
downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances
was denied. Defendant Mattie Lou Thomas was involved in the
possession of almost four kilograms of heroin. Because of her
cooperation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3553(e), the government had requested a six-year sentence, less than the otherwise mandatory ten-year prison sentence required under the
Guidelines. The district court judge granted a downward departure and sentenced Thomas to probation." 1 The Seventh
Circuit vacated the sentence based upon the district court's
improper section 5H1.6 interpretation.'2 2 The court noted
that Thomas had "extremely burdensome family responsibilities," including the fact that "[elach of Thomas's three adult
children is mentally disabled ....Thomas [was] also the legal
guardian of a four year-old grandson. She care[d] for her children alone; Thomas last saw her husband in 1984."" Yet applying its strict and somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of
section 5H1.6, the court held these facts about her family responsibilities to be "not ordinarily relevant" in a non-probation
case such as Thomas. Therefore, the motion for a downward
departure was denied."
E.

"Extraordinary"Circumstancesand Case Rhetoric

A review of the caselaw in the area of downward departures based upon "extraordinary" family responsibilities sug-

119Id.

at 86.

930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1991).
121 Id. at 527.
122 Id. at 528.
123 Id.
124Id. at 531.
120
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gests that outcomes turned primarily upon the rhetoric used by
the sentencing court, not the factors presented by the defendant. Thus, unwarranted disparity arguably arises because
sentence outcomes seemingly depend upon talented advocacy,
rather than upon consistent, predictable offender characteristics. Yet this conclusion-driven approach couched in laudatory
descriptions of offender-parents toiling heroically to support
multi-generations of family may well be "extraordinary" in the
eyes of a Second Circuit panel. The analytical problem, however, lies in the inescapable conclusion that this "approach" is
little more than a visceral response to some unidentified factual clues which may not be predictable in every case. Moreover,
the inherent pitfall in the "extraordinary vs. ordinary" departure approach is the uncertainty of just what family circumstances qualify one for such a departure. The Johnson court, as
did the Alba court before it, spent considerable time detailing
the family structures and the defendant's central role in each
family unit. However, the court failed to emphasize a critical
conclusion common to both Alba and Johnson: removal of the
defendant would lead to "destruction," not disruption, of the
family. It is this key phrase, and perhaps ultimate moral standard that reveals the true departure criterion underlying Johnson. Moreover, it is unclear how out of the "ordinary" these
family structures are in relation to greater society, the offender
class itself or the prison population.'25 While the defendants
" A threshold question is begged by this theme of "not ordinary" that runs

through § 5H.1 offender characteristic departures. What is the baseline experience
or community against which the court is to measure what is "ordinary?" The argument can be made that without some reference point by which to measure, sen-

tencing courts will resort to personal family experiences or other arbitrary sources.
In United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
844 (1990), the court chose the reference point of "bank embezzlers" in reviewing
the applicability of a downward departure for two female bank tellers who had
embezzled $28,000:
The district court failed to point out why the defendants' community
support or family ties were 'substantially in excess' of those generally
involved in other bank teller embezzlement cases, especially those cases
. Many bank tellers who defraud
which occur in small town settings ...
national banks have long tenured employment, enjoy community support,
have families to raise and support, or other family responsibilities. We
have serious doubt that these factors are sufficiently 'unusual' to warrant
departure.

Id. at 508-09.
Should determination of the extraordinary nature of the circumstance be
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in Alba and Johnson were highly responsible family members,
it would be difficult to predict whether any other defendants'
situations could duplicate the Alba and Johnson facts sufficiently to warrant a downward departure pursuant to section
5H1.6. Without some benchmark for what criteria must be met
before his or her family circumstances will be deemed "extraordinary," a defendant's only hope may be to receive the same
panel that heard the Alba and Johnson cases.126
Compare, for example, the facts of the Second Circuit case
United States v. Alba1 7 with those of the recent Ninth Circuit case United States v. Miller.2 ' Both defendants were living in apparently loving, intact marriages with two young dependent children. Neither defendant had prior convictions and
both faced Guidelines ranges above 12 months. The Alba defendant, John Gonzalez, received a downward departure and
confinement in a half-way house for six months because of his
"extraordinary" family responsibilities under section 5H1.6.
The Ninth Circuit vacated Rachelle Miller's downward departure because her situation was not "extraordinary" within the
meaning of section 5H1.6. 2 9 The dissent in Miller, citing Alba, chastised the majority for ignoring the district court's findings:
The district court here found the Miller family circumstances
"unique." Rachelle Miller provided substantial emotional and physical support to [her] young children, the youngest of which was actually born while the case was pending, and incarceration would place

gauged by the outside world or the prison population? In United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1993), Judge Ferguson, writing in concurrence, mused about the appropriate standard for inquiry regarding the blindness of
the defendant who sought a downward departure under § 5H1.4 (extraordinary
physical impairment): "[T]he proper finding involves a determination of whether
the defendant's impairment is sufficiently extraordinary to permit downward departure from the otherwise applicable guidelines sentencing range. Thus, conditions
that might be entirely ordinary or widespread in the world outside of prison may
still constitute extraordinary physical impairments under § 5H1.4." Id. at 621.
126 It is noteworthy that Chief Judge Oakes and Judges Cardamone and
Mahoney heard United States v. Alba and Chief Judge Oakes and Judges
Cardamone and Pierce heard United States v. Johnson. It may well be sufficient
to have Judge Cardamone on the panel: he authored the opinion in United States
v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990), and sat on the panel that decided United
States v. Sharpsteen, 913 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990).
i" 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991).
128 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1993).
1

Id. at 556-57 (Tang, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the children at potential risk. The majority apparently concluded out
of hand that because Miller is not the sole caretaker of her children,
"extraordinary family circumstances" cannot be established as a
matter of law. Surely we do not wish to convey to district courts that
it is not important to keep families intact or that children (especially
infants) may not require the added stability of two parents. Clearly,
whether "extraordinary family circumstances" exist depend on the
court's knowledge of the defendant and her family-a factual matter
within the province of the district court. The district court was not
clearly erroneous in its determination.'

It is disturbing, then, that the Second Circuit granted John
Gonzalez's downward departure motion because "his is a closeknit family whose stability depends on Gonzalez's continued
presence,"'' while the Ninth Circuit denied Rachelle Miller's
motion despite the district court's express findings that she
provided needed physical and emotional support for her young
family. It is equally disturbing that unwarranted sentencing
disparity will continue to arise simply because district courts
do not couch their downward departure decisions in sufficiently
extreme language. It is significant that in Miller, the Ninth
Circuit majority suggested that it might have reached a different result had the record "support[ed] a finding that the children... would be exposed to a substantially greater risk of
harm than can normally be expected when there is an extended forced separation from one parent."' What the proof of
that "substantially greater risk of harm" might entail is not explained. This absence of criteria is characteristic of the "extraordinary" nature of the proof needed to defeat the presumption in section 5H1.6 that a defendant's family circumstances
are probably "ordinary" and, therefore, irrelevant to the sentencing decision. But without guidance, district courts must
grope for the operative language that will satisfy critical appellate courts which demand only the "extraordinary."
Among the circuits, the Second Circuit seems the most
receptive to the development, even encouragement, of downward departure jurisprudence in this area. The Johnson and
Alba cases taken together demonstrate that the Second Circuit
sets a threshold for the "extraordinary" that can be met by

' Id. at 556.
"'
"z

Alba, 933 F.2d at 1122.
Miller, 991 F.2d at 533 n.1.
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defendants who, despite their criminal nonviolent wrongdoing,
have at least succeeded as parents. Thus the Johnson precedent makes exploration of a defendant's family circumstances a
worthwhile rather than a futile exercise, would be the case in
the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, the general Second Circuit receptivity to section 5H1.6 downward departures also is reflected in
the district court cases where the family circumstances and
parenting skills of the defendants have been pegged at the
extraordinary level by the sentencing courts. 3 3 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit treatment in United States v. Miller, the Second
Circuit does not second-guess the district court's factual findings concerning the "extraordinary" nature of a defendant's
circumstances. Thus the district courts and Second Circuit
13 In United States v. Mills, Nos. 88 CR 956, 89 CR 256, 1990 WL 8081 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1990), the district court judge departed downward for, among
other factors, the extraordinary family circumstances present in the case:
Are extraordinary circumstances present in this case? I think that
they are within that context of family ties and responsibilities ....
I
conferred with the probation officer, Ms. Macheco. [She] has conducted a
careful and thorough examination into Ms. Mills' family situation. Ms.
Pacheco tells me in substance that in her experience she has never encountered a defendant so deprived of any other responsible adult who
could take over for the children present in the defendant's care.
It is not unusual for a defendant convicted of a crime to have children in his or her care. What's unusual is the [sic] for practical purposes
total absence of responsible adults in a position to come forward and
replace the defendant if the defendant is incarcerated. That in and of
itself is an unusual circumstance. Surely it is unusual in my own experience as a sentencing judge.
Id.; see also United States v. McGee, 802 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (departure
for welfare of 11-year-old nephew who had been abused and was dependent upon
defendant for therapeutic environment); United States v. Arize, 792 F. Supp. 920
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (departure due to unknown pregnancy and potential for permanent
loss of custody of children if imprisoned for more than two years); United States
v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (departure due to health of defendant
mother and unborn child); United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (single parent of three teenage children and exceptionally promising future
of the two older children would be threatened by mother's incarceration). Compare
United States v. Sessa, 821 F. Supp. 870, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), in which Judge
Weinstein gave no downward departure in sentencing defendants convicted of racketeering and related offenses:
The close-knit and loving relationships of thee defendants with their
children, their spouses or their paramours do not take precedence over
their continuing evil power and their urge to commit serious crimes. The
court regrets the pain caused defendant's relatives by the harsh sentences that must be imposed; it is defendant's voluntary criminal acts that
are responsible for their punishment.
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seem to be "in sync" regarding the standard of proof required
for "extraordinary." Such a clear philosophical alliance between
the Second Circuit and the district court logically must discourage prosecutors from appealing even borderline downward
departures granted under section 5H1.6.
Underlying the Second Circuit's departure philosophy is a
premise that is not shared by all other circuits about the creation of the Guidelines. Indeed, central to understanding its
downward departure jurisprudence is that the Second Circuit
seems highly skeptical about what the Commission may have
considered in formulating the offender characteristics policies
contained in Chapter 5H1. As 18 U.S.C. section 3553(b) provides, departures are permitted when "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Commission in formulating the
Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described."'34
To be sure, little is known about what exactly was considered by the Sentencing Commission in the area of offender
characteristics and whether that consideration was adequate.13 Circuit courts have interpreted the very existence of
a pronouncement that offender characteristics are "not ordinarily relevant" as adequate proof that due consideration was
given by the Sentencing Commission. 3 s The Second Circuit,

18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1985).
" In The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, Judge Stephen Breyer commented that:
One important area of [trade-ofil] compromise concerns 'offender' characteristics. The Commission extensively debated which offender characteristics should make a difference in sentencing; that is, which characteristics
134

were important enough to warrant formal reflection within the Guidelines
and which should constitute possible grounds for departure. Some argued

in favor of taking past arrest records into account as an aggravating
factor .... Others argued that factors such as age, employment history,
and family ties should be treated as mitigating factors ... .As a result,

the current offender characteristics rules look primarily to past records of
convictions .... The rules do not take formal account of past arrest
records or drug use, or the other offender characteristics which Congress
suggested that the Commission should, -but was not required to, consider.
In a word, the offender characteristics rules reflect traditional compromise.
Breyer, supra note 21, at 19-20.
' See United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sutherland,
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however, is considerably less generous in its interpretation. It
apparently presumes that the Commission did not anticipate a
specific sentencing factor unless it described that factor in
detail in the Guidelines or Policy Statements. In United States
v. Johnson,"7 the Second Circuit, in considering the application of section 5H1.6 to Cynthia Johnson's family situation,
concluded that while the Commission designed section 5H1.6
to cover "ordinary family responsibility," it did not intend this
section to cover all family circumstances: "[e]xtraordinary circumstances... are by their nature not capable of adequate
consideration. They therefore may constitute proper grounds
for departure." 8' Thus, because the Second Circuit had
adopted a "minimalist" premise about what could have been
fathomed by the Commission, it has great leeway in developing
its downward departures jurisprudence.
That the Commission at least considered family circumstances is clear, but what it believed to be "ordinary" family
circumstances and the ordinary and tolerable consequences of
incarceration upon a family is somewhat shrouded in mystery
and subject to intense speculation. For example, the Ninth
Circuit in Miller asserted that the Commission considered that
"disruption of the parental relationship when a parent is imprisoned almost always exposes children to the risk of psychological harm."'39 The First Circuit, by contrast, concluded
that the "Commission was fully aware that some convicted
felons are single parents of small children."" While consideration of the psychological damage to young dependents if a
parent is incarcerated is a logical inference to draw, it is only
an inference. It is equally likely that the Commission, after
reviewing the offender profiles, considered that the majority of
imprisoned offenders are males who are likely to leave their
children with their mothers or other traditional caretakers.' 4 '
Therefore it may well have seemed unnecessary for the Commission to consider the plight of offender dependents.'
890 F.2d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989).
1- 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
138 Id. at 128.

139991 F.2d 552, 553 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993).
.. United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.

Ct. 334 (1992).
.. See supra note 107.
142 Professor Myrna Raeder notes that the Sentencing Commission was and
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The Commission however, was directed by Congress, to
design Guidelines that would "guard against the inappropriate
use of incarceration for those defendants who lack education,
employment, and stabilizing ties." Such a directive implies
that the Guidelines should not tilt in favor of incarceration for
the unattached, unemployed or uneducated. Arguably, if proof
of mere parenthood, standing alone, were enough to warrant a
downward departure from the applicable Guidelines range and,
therefore, a lesser sentence, a gnawing sense of unjust disparity would result.'" Yet proof of more than merely a
defendant's status as a "parent" may constitute a respectable
sentencing factor. Proof of impending devastation of a family
unit if parental removal occurs may well qualify as a basis for
a "warranted" departure from a Guidelines range. A downward
departure would permit a family to adjust to a manageable
level of family disruption and avoid excessive punishment for

remains in an excellent position to study this particular issue:
It should be remembered that the Sentencing Reform Act directed the
Commission "to reflect to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."
Ignoring the wealth of information concerning single parenting, the disruption caused to children by incarcerating a single parent, and the rehabilitative effects of parenting violates the letter as well as the spirit of
the law.
Raeder, supra note 108, at 958 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(c) (Supp. 1992)).
"'
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3358 (discussing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473).
'" Certainly, Cynthia Johnson's co-defendant Cheryl Purvis might complain with
some credibility that she was the victim of unwarranted disparity. Professor
Myrna Raeder addresses this concern:
Some will argue that the availability of such departures simply gives a
break to mothers. However, since the guidelines have virtually ignored
women, attention to this issue is actually an attempt to devise a rational
sentencing policy for females which recognizes their separate pattern of
criminality and concern about disruption to their children's lives, and
inferior access to child visitation have never been viewed as criminal
penalties. However, it is unrealistic to claim that women who face such
issues are being punished in a manner equal to male offenders whose
children remain with their mothers and who can more easily visit the
male parent because he is incarcerated closer to home . . . . While a
consequence-based standard for decision-making regarding family departures may not be an ideal approach to female sentencing in the abstract,
given the restrictions imposed by the Guidelines it is a significant improvement over current practice.
Reder, supra note 108, at 962.
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the offender's crime.
The developing downward departure jurisprudence shows
that only exemplary or successful parenting is considered for
downward -departures. While the Second Circuit in Johnson
commented that "Judge Patterson made it clear that the departure was not on behalf of the defendant herself, but on
behalf of her family," it was also clear that the court's affirmance of the departure was not because "Johnson's family
circumstances decrease[d] her culpability, but that we are
reluctant it wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents
who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing."14 Arguably the Second Circuit views the downward departure
mechanism found in section 5H1.6 as a way to avoid causing a
societal harm greater than the harm caused by the offender.
This approach, however, is the antithesis of the approach
taken by other circuits that do not view the offender's family
as a significant part of the greater society. Therefore, those
courts do not utilize any downward departure mechanism to
adjust the punishment to the offender's situation. This sentencing philosophy was aptly summarized in United States v.
Brewer: "[a]lthough a short prison term may impose hardship,
'[ulnfortunately, it is not uncommon for innocent young family
members, including children... to suffer as a result of a
parent's incarceration."'146 The First Circuit in United States
v. Pozzy 47 disallowed the defendant's pregnancy as a factor
relevant to a downward departure. The Pozzy court washed its
hands of the consequences of this decision by commenting: "it
has been recognized since time immemorial that the sins of
parents are visited upon their children."48 Such an ancient
moralistic approach to the consequences of offender wrongdoing may be woefully short-sighted. Commentators, on the other
hand, have urged serious consideration of the long-range and
avoidable harm done to the offender's minor children when
incapacitation of the offender is unnecessary:

14

United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992).

1..

United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 508 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States

v. Fitirman, No. 89 CR 176-1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 1989)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844
(1990).
147 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
146 Id.
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An incarcerative sentence may have a distinctly different impact on
a parent than it has on a non-parent. For example, in many states
incarceration constitutes a ground for termination of parental rights.
A two year prison sentence does not equal two years in prison accompanied by permanent loss of child custody. Justice requires considering the consequences of a sentence for the defendant's children
where they lead to such different effective quantities of punishment."'

Judicial scrutiny of the disproportionality of punishment is

consistent with the Congress' chief purpose of revamping the
federal sentencing scheme through the adoption of the Guidelines. As the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 noted, "the purpose of
the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an
individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition
of individualized sentences." 150
The difficulty in fashioning the appropriate sentence under
the Guidelines may arise because federal judges are unclear as
to their new sentencing mission. The Commission did not include a discussion of the purposes of sentencing under the
Guidelines. The absence of any stated purposes has led to a
void, especially regarding use of departures:
ETihe Commission should still issue guidelines or policy statements
to guide judges in evaluating purposes. Directions concerning purposes would help judges in deciding whether and how to depart from
the guidelines, interpret guideline ambiguities, and select among
different available sanctions. Though an empirical analysis may
provide a useful starting point, purposes are needed to explain deviations from the empirically produced sentences."'

However, the Commission in its introduction to the Guidelines,
justified its silence by noting that "a clear-cut Commission
decision in favor of one of these [perceptions of the purposes of
149 Eleanor L. Bush, Not Ordinarily Relevant? Considering the Defendant's Children at Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1990, at 15; see also Susan E.
Ellingstod, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures Based on a
Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L. REV. 957

(1992).
1 0 SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1983,
S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, at 52 n.2 (1983), reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3235.
...See Miler, supra note 40, at 443.
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criminal punishment] approaches would diminish the chance
that the Guidelines would find the widespread acceptance they
need for effective implementation."'52 Yet Guidelines implementation without clear direction has lead the judiciary to very
different Guidelines results. The majority of courts do look to
the Commission for guidance regarding appropriate offender
characteristics that can be considered at sentencing. The confusion among circuits regarding what was in fact considered by
the Commission stems from the relative silence of the Commission itself. Undeniably, the Guidelines reflect the
Commission's belief that "Congress, pursuant to its goal of
reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities, intended Guidelines Sentencing to be offense-oriented, rather than offenderoriented."'53 Yet the Commission may have overreacted to the
directive of Congress to design guidelines that do not rely upon
inappropriate offender characteristics in meting out punishment.'54 The Commission has been criticized for its underdeveloped approach to offender characteristics as mitigating
factors:
After all the months of study-including presumably the experience
of the sentencers-the Commission produced substantially nothing
to identify the terrain left for what was now "not ordinarily relevant." With that omission, the Commission put largely outside the
pale a variety of factors that sentencing judges have treated over the
years as mitigating circumstances. The results have included some
evasion or warping of the guidelines-by judges along with prosecutors and defense counsel. 55

What sentencing courts struggle with is finding a principled way to reconcile the Guidelines' directives with their authority to depart in appropriate
situations involving certain
56
offender characteristics.

12
1

U.S.S.G. § ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. (1987).
Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kepp, An Examination of Emerging Departure

Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,

24 (1991).
154 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1993).
155 Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration,
101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2048 (1992).
" One commentator has noted:

It is true that the primary mandate of the Commission was to establish
guidelines that would eliminate disparities in the sentences of similarly
situated offenders, but offenders who differ from one another in their
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Courts attempt to divine the significance of the
Commission's mere acknowledgement of an offender characteristic that may not ordinarily be relevant. The Commission's
failure or conscious decision to be vague or reticent as to its
thinking in this Guidelines area stirs some commentators to
urge federal courts to fill the leadership void:
Congress nowhere stated or implied that the Commission's mention
of a factor in a sentencing guideline, policy statement or official
commentary would be sufficient to bind a district court. It did not,
as the Commission casually asserted in the original Guidelines Manual, authorize the Commission to decide for itself that it had adequately considered a topic. The question of adequacy was specifically
delegated to courts by § 3553 (b).'57

As has been demonstrated in Johnson, the Second Circuit
without hesitation has entered the breach created by the
Guidelines and asserted its own authority to define "not ordinary" family ties which should warrant sentencing departures.
Furthermore, the downward departure jurisprudence created
by the Second Circuit greatly contributes to the body of information about meritorious offender characteristics that should
not be ignored by sentencing courts. Similarly, the downward
departure justifications offered by both the district and circuit
courts stimulate thought about the purposes of sentencing
which the Commission left unstated. That the sketchy treatment of offender characteristics under the Guidelines should
be revisited was noted recently by Sentencing Commissioner
lene H. Nagel:
The scope for legitimate consideration of individualoffender characteristics is also ripe for reexamination. And greater use of overt
downward departures on the record for appropriate reasons might

reasonably be encouraged. We do not by any means propose a return
to the days when sentences could be mitigated on the basis of social
standing, reputation, good deeds, or the sense that a pillar of the
community has "suffered enough" However, the scope of what is "not
ordinarily relevant" could be narrowed to some extent, and some
individual case circumstances might usefully be flagged as potential-

personal circumstances are not similarly situated. As the Court [in
Eddings v. Oklahoma] has noted, "a consistency produced by ignoring
individual differences is a false consistency.
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1958 (1988).
" See Freed, supra note 13, at 1733-34.
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Review of the Second Circuit's departure patterns places
Johnson in clearer perspective. Even the Commission noted
the downward departure granted in Johnson, describing it as a
case involving "atypical circumstances involving offender characteristics as basis for departure."'59 While the section 5H1.6
downward departure jurisprudence created by the Second Circuit may be of little comfort to a defendant such as Johnson's
co-defendant Purvis, who lacked factors showing "extraordinary" circumstances, it does avoid the highly questionable
Guidelines result of destruction of an offender's family."6 Yet
the downward departure jurisprudence created by the Second
Circuit is of little value to offenders in general unless they can
present mitigating circumstances which will be considered "extraordinary" or at least factors not considered in kind or to a
degree by the Commission. The following section examines
whether the present guidelines investigative system maximizes
discovery of such critical sentencing facts.

1"3
159

See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 559.
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, Addendum at 19. It is noteworthy that

the Commission described the Johnson court's reasoning as being "reluctant to
'wreak' extraordinary destruction on dependents who rely solely on the defendant
for their upbringing." Id. The Commission apparently does not characterize Johnson as a case involving a downward departure based upon the defendant's "parental and family responsibility." See id. Such departure basis has been disapproved
by and so noted by the Commission in the majority of cases. See id. at 19A n.65.
While at first glance the downward departure upheld in Johnson might have
been readily categorized as a "parental/family responsibility departure," a closer
inspection of the Johnson opinion reveals the critical language may well be the
reference to "extraordinary destruction on dependents." It would appear that destruction, as opposed to the routine disruption or hardship that follows when a
parent leaves home for an extended period of time, may be crucial to the viability
of this downward departure bases.
1" It may be unfair to conclude that Johnson's co-defendant lacked any grounds
for a downward departure. It is impossible to discern whether a sentence imposed
within the "appropriate" Guidelines range was erroneous. "It is settled law in this
circuit that a defendant generally may not appeal from a district court's decision
not to depart downwardly from the applicable guidelines range because the decision is 'inherently discretionary' .... ." United States v. Sharpsteen, 913 F.2d 59,
62 (2d Cir. 1990).
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III. IMPACT OF JOHNSON ON THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
PROCESS: LOOKING FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURES IN ALL
THE RIGHT PLACES?
Although the average federal defendant may naively believe that the district court judge alone determines the sentencing outcome in her case, it is increasingly more likely that
the sentence imposed on "judgment day" is the direct outgrowth of the factual detail presented in the presentence investigative report prepared by a Probation Office. While the presentence investigative report ("PSI") has always been of assistnce to the courts, its importance has been enlarged by the
Guidelines sentencing scheme. As part of the Guidelines' structure, complicated assessments must be made concerning the
precise nature of the offense, the manner of the commission of
the crime and its impact upon the victim. The sentencing court
relies heavily upon the initial case evaluation and Guidelines
calculations done by the United States Probation Office. Thus
the PSI makes the first and perhaps most lingering impression
court in its application of the Guidelines
upon the sentencing 16
to a defendant's case. 1
As the one person from whom mastery of the Guidelines
maze is expected, the author of the PSI plays a crucial role in
ferreting out and presenting the relevant facts for purposes of
sentencing. In light of the requirement that sentences may be
challenged on appeal if they deviate from the appropriate
Guidelines range, the PSI will be instrumental in the ultimate
determination of whether the Guidelines range was "appropriate" and whether any sentence deviation was justified by the
facts. The PSI is unquestionably a critical first step in obtaining a sentencing result that will withstand reversal if appealed. Despite the "fact-finding" role now assigned to presen-

C' The PSI has consequences for the defendant even after sentencing. The PSI
is used by the Bureau of Prison to classify the sentenced offender and to designate the appropriate security level facility. Information in the PSI will be used by
case managers at the correctional facility to familiarize themselves with the
inmate's history and program needs. The document will continue to be a reference
point regarding future prison decisions concerning the inmate. The PSI is just as
important following release from the custody during the period of supervised release because once the inmate is returned to the community, he or she is monitored.
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tence investigators, it may be no clearer to them than to a
district court judge exactly what personal information about
the defendant should be relevant for purposes of sentencing
under the Guidelines regime. This uncertainty arises from the
approach adopted by the Guidelines. While the Commission
provided concrete examples of certain factors bearing upon
sentencing "adjustments,"'62 the Commission gave little direction regarding downward departures.'63 Moreover the Guide162 The base level of the offense can be raised or lowered by use of adjustments. Chapter 3 of the Guidelines Manual lists adjustments such as: § 3A1.1,
Vulnerable Victim (2 level increase); § 3A1.2, Official Victim (3 level increase); §
3B1.1, Aggravating Role (2,3 or 4 level increase); § 3B1.2, Mitigating Role (2,3 or
4 level decrease); § 3C1.2, Reckless Endangerment During Flight (2 level increase);
§ 3E1.1, Acceptance of Responsibility (2 level decrease). See generally U.S.S.G. §§
3A1.1 to 3E1.1 (Nov. 1992).
13 Unguided downward departures can be of two kinds: (1) if the Guidelines
identify a factor as a basis for departure but do not provide specific guidance in
the extent of the departure, it is unguided, or (2) if an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance is of a kind or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission, the Probation Office's PSI, Publication 107 provides
the following suggested 5-step deductive procedure for the analysis of an unguided
departure:
1. List all mitigating and aggravating factors in the case.
*This step requires a comprehensive review of all of the relevant
sentencing factors related to the offense conduct as well as to the
behavior and background of the defendant.
2. what factors on the list do the Guidelines identify as ordinarily not
a basis for departure?
*Such factors are eliminated unless they are extraordinary. This
second step ensures that a factor identified by the Guidelines or
case law in the circuit as an inappropriate basis for departure is not
considered.
3. Of the remaining factors, are there any which the Guidelines have
not considered or that exist in a degree not taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission?
-The third step eliminates factors already taken into account by
the Guidelines.
4. Does any Guideline, commentary, or policy statement authorize or
support the factors identified in step 3?
*The fourth step requires a search of the Guidelines Manual and
case law in the circuit to find any authority or support for a departure based on the identified factors in step 3. Part K of chapter five
of the Guidelines Manual provides various grounds for departure and
other guidelines, commentary, and policy statements throughout the
manual also discuss circumstances that might warrant a departure.
5. Are there any factors identified in step 3 that would not warrant a
change in the offense level or criminal history category if the Guidelines
had taken them into account?
*The fifth step ensures that the identified departure factor would
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lines have been amended and clarified through Policy Statements and Commentaries constantly over the past five years.
Thus, the motivation, let alone the standard by which to identify plausible downward departure factors, must originate with
the PSI writer because the Guidelines Manual and Commission offer negligible or belated help.
The very significance of the PSI and increased influence of
the presentence writer in the Guidelines era has led to unprecedented tension between the Probation Office, defense counsel
and government attorneys." The probation officer is now
seen as an adversary in the sentencing process by both defense
counsel and prosecutors. Moreover, probation officers are
viewed with great suspicion, even mistrust, by defense counsel,
who consider the probation officer as an ally of the prosecution."'5 The current preception of the probation officer as
more hostile toward than helpful to the offender may reflect
the redefined role of presentence writer. This role places little
emphasis on developing a relationship with the offender. A
plausible explanation for the possible change in attitude dis-

actually warrant a change in the sentencing range. For instance, an
aggravating factor may be identified that was not taken into account
by the Guidelines, but if it had been considered, neither the offense
level nor the criminal history category would change.
16 In their survey of federal charging and sentencing practices in three districts, Professors Ilene H. Nagel and Stephen J. Schulhofer identified common
patterns in all three districts. Among the issues common to these districts was the
inter-agency tension:
Tension between defense counsel and probation officers runs high. Probation officers shoulder the blame for either thwarting plea agreements that
circumvent the guidelines or "spooking" the AUSA's [Assistant United
States Attorneys], with the result that AUSA's are reluctant to circumvent the guidelines in as many cases as defense counsel believe appropriate. The most common allegation is that probation officers are not lawyers and thus fail to appreciate problems of proof.
See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 545.
" Defense counsel related to the probation PSI writers in a more positive way
before the Guidelines era:
Defense attorneys rarely requested to be present during presentence interviews. In fact[,j most placed a premium on cooperation with the officer, directing their clients to truthfully answer all questions posed by the
probation officer. Many attorneys helped the officer by assisting their
clients in gathering and presenting information needed for the presentence report.
Jerry D. Denzlinger & David E. Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before
and After Guidelines Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 49-50.
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played by some probation officers toward offenders has been offered by Tony Garoppolo of the United States Probation Department for the Eastern District of New York: "The probation
officer is placed in a difficult situation. The officer supervises
federal offenders, a function which increasingly calls for investigation and monitoring skills, as opposed to clinical social
work expertise, since the medical model of correctional work
continues its demise." 6 In the pre-Guidelines era, this "medical" or diagnostic model was reflected in the PSI. Probation
officers were expected to diagnose the social or psychological
causes of the defendant's criminal behavior, predict the likelihood such a person could be rehabilitated and suggest the
means by which the sentencing court could effect that transformation through sentencing. The PSIs were narrative, contained no factual findings about the offense but often reflected
a behaviorist theory.167
With the restriction on sentencing alternatives under the
Guidelines and its de-emphasis of offender rehabilitation, the
probation officer's job focus has changed. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has codified this change. 68

" Tony Garoppolo, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 291, 303 (1990).
"The United States probation officer, typically educated in the behavioral
sciences, was selected for service in the probation system after demonstrating skills in working for the "welfare of others," most commonly,
offenders. The probation officer came to employment with a variety of
skills, not the least of which were assessing factors contributing to behavior maladjustment, investigating, writing, and counseling. The officer's
required knowledge base was primarily concerned with social/human behavior; however, knowledge of statutes and Federal rules associated with
sentencing and sentencing alternatives was also critical.
Denzlinger & Miller, supra note 165, at 49.
16 Rule 32(c)(2) states:
Report: The report of the presentence investigation shall contain(A) Information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, financial condition,
and any circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that may
be helpful in imposing sentence or in the correctional treatment of
the defendant;
(B) The classification of the offense and of the defendant under the
categories established by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to §
994(a) of title 28, that the probation officer believes to be applicable to the defendant's case; the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range suggested for such a category of offense committed by
such a category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued
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Probation officers are no longer asked to assess the defendant's
character and the possibility of rehabilitation outside of prison;
they instead are asked to chart the defendant's position on a
sentencing matrix. Gone from Rule 32 itself is language commanding that the PSI provide information that may be helpful
"in granting probation." In its place is language commanding
the presentence writer to report all damage done to the victim
by the offender and to stay abreast of all Commission directives. In their new Guidelines roles, probation officers feel
attacked not only by defense counsel, but by federal prosecutors as well, to whom probation officers must address unwelcome inquiries about the facts of the case. Since objections can
be made to the findings in the presentence report by both prosecution and defense, the PSI writer can often feel defensive
and isolated. Thus the sentencing court may receive three
divergent sentencing recommendations from the prosecutor,
defense counsel and the probation officer.
With the statutorily imposed emphasis upon describing in
great detail the offense characteristics rather than the offender
and the goal of achieving standardized sentencing, the Guidelines structure gives little incentive to the probation officer to
gather extensive information on the personal history of the
defendant other than researching his or her prior criminal
missteps. The PSI writer could readily conclude that information about the offender's character, accomplishments and life
history before commission of the offense are irrelevant for
sentencing purposes. The best use to which background data
such as stable family life, drug free life style, long employment

by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1);
and an explanation by the probation officer of any factors that may
indicate that a sentence of a different kind or of a different length
than one within the applicable guideline would be more appropriate
under all the circumstances;

(C) Any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2);
(D) Verified information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and
medical impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom the
offense has been committed;
(E) Unless the court orders otherwise, information concerning the
nature and extent of non-prison programs and resources available
for the defendant; and
(F) Such other information as may be required by the court.
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history and extensive voluntary community service record can
be put is to help place a defendant at the lower end of the
Guidelines sentence range. Background information may also
help fashion conditions of probation for those few who are
lucky enough to qualify for this sentencing option. The PSI
personal history information will also assist other probation
officers during the supervised release period following the
offender's completion of any custody sentence. This personal
history information, however, has limited impact upon selection of "appropriate" offense punishment level assigned to the
offender's crime by the Guidelines Manual. In short, the lawabiding, even virtuous, life one led before the commission of a
crime counts for very little within the Guidelines strucfederal
169
ture.
Not surprisingly, the presentence investigation process
generated by the Guidelines approach has drawn criticism.
Senior Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York has remarked:
Under the Guidelines, probation reports are no longer designed to
uncover good as well as bad facts about defendants. They mechanically describe what the Guidelines consider relevant, so that the
judge often will not be aware that there is a basis for departure ....
Defense counsel, unfortunately, are often merely passive when it
0
comes to gathering evidence for sentencing."

Despite frustration expressed by some members of the judiciary about the "uninspired" investigative work produced by those
probation officers who adhere strictly to the offense focus of the
Guidelines, federal judges generally commend probation officers for the excellent job done within the Guidelines regime.
Professors Nagel and Schulhofer note that: "[Probation officers
articulate frustration with judges, viewing them as being unfamiliar with the guidelines, manipulating the guidelines, or
unjustifiably siding with the government on disputed facts. In
contrast, judges report confidence in and admiration for the
excellent job done by the probation officers."' 7 ' Indeed the
probation officer often facilitates better Guidelines treatment

"'

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D).

o Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 364 (1992).
...See Nagel & Schullhofer, supra note 51, at 545.
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for an offender than do defense counsel who remain "Guidelines shy." That defense counsel have fallen behind in becoming conversant with Guidelines opportunities for their clients
has been acknowledged in various quarters.'72 The danger in
the low level of Guidelines competency displayed by many
defense attorneys is that their clients are left at the mercy of
the offense bias of the Guidelines' evaluation structure. Therefore, the Guidelines calculations prepared by the PSI writer
will be determinative of the sentencing outcome by default
because a defendant's counsel is unprepared to do battle over
Guidelines nuances that might be favorable to the offender.
Passionate, but uninformed, arguments for leniency by unprepared defense counsel will be of no avail unless a path through
the Guidelines jungle can be mapped out for the judge; apparently the only person who has a compass is the probation PSI
writer.
Having recognized the importance of the probation officer's
preliminary fact-finding role in a defendant's sentencing outcome, this Article now examines whether defendants will likely
receive the benefits of Johnson's holding. Does the Johnson
case give sufficient guidance to the PSI writer to allow identification of the appropriate "offender characteristics" which the
172 Chief

Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit noted:
After 3 years of considering appeals from sentences imposed under the
guidelines, I have become convinced that attorneys have yet to take full
advantage of the mechanisms for judicial discretion built into the guidelines. The continued failure of counsel competently to participate in the
adversarial process of guideline sentencing has resulted in a number of
unfortunate consequences. A judge who receives no assistance from an
incompetent defense attorney unfamiliar with the proper arguments in
favor of a downward departure may impose an excessively harsh sentence.
Tjoflat, supra note 41, at 4.
Professors Ilene H. Nagel and Stephen J. Schulhofer in their survey of three
cities also observed:
There is little doubt that probation officers are the most conversant with
the guidelines and knowledgeable about their application . . .Most federal defenders, particularly Chief Federal Defenders, are very conversant
with the Guidelines. The federal defenders are excellent advocates, for
their positions, appreciate the nuances of the guidelines and are effective
in gaining benefits for their clients .... Even though we interviewed
only private defense attorneys who were putatively experienced with the
Guidelines, this group's mastery of the Guidelines was consistently unimpressive.
Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 546.
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Second Circuit favorably considers in granting downward departures? Such a discussion leads to the unavoidable question
raised by the Guidelines' absence of emphasis on finding unguided downward departures: are defendant's "extraordinary"
family ties and responsibilities, which might warrant a downward departure, normally highlighted as such to the sentencing court? A related and perhaps equally crucial question is
whether anyone within the sentencing system is actively
seaiching for the factors that make a defendant's family circumstances qualify as "extraordinary" under the Guidelines
rubric. Case law and the Sentencing Commission Annual Reports can provide only limited clues to the questions posed. In
an effort to obtain some empirical information regarding the
attitudes and experiences of actual federal probation officers,
the author prepared a survey ("Survey") and distributed it to
3
all the probation districts within the Second Circuit.
A.

Content of PresentenceInvestigationReport

The product that the PSI writer creates for sentencing
purposes has a standardized format. Aided by the Guidelines
Sentencing Worksheets and the United States Probation Office
Presentence Investigative Report Manual,'4 PSI writers conduct an investigation that will allow them to inform the sentencing judge about the criminal history of the offender, the
offense for which the offender is convicted and the characteris173 Surveys were sent to the following U.S. Probation Officers within Second

Circuit: Southern District of New York, Eastern District of New York, Northern
District of New York, Western District of New York, Districts of Connecticut and

Vermont. All PSI writers and supervisors were invited to respond.
The surveys consisted of 44 guidelines related questions and 19 personal data
questions. The surveys were distributed in May 1993 and received by June 30,
1993 (all surveys on file with author). Respondents were advised that confidentiality would be maintained. Accordingly, this Article will refer to individual Survey
respondents by a cnded number only.
Although the number of Survey responses were too few to be statistically
valid, the Survey respondents constituted a focus group who revealed the varied
attitudes of the PSI writers toward their investigative tasks. Moreover, the informal anecdotal responses to the Survey raise issues that have arisen in the context
of probation officers trying to reconcile the sentencing directives generated by the
Commission and the departure case law developed by the federal judiciary.
' The Presentence Investigative Report, Publication 107, was designed by the
Probation Office; most participants in the Survey responded that they no longer
use the Guidelines worksheets.

1993]

NOT ORDINARILY RELEVANT

tics of the offense conduct that really depict the dangerousness
of the crime and the degree of serious injury caused. The latter
might include use of weapon, drug purity or quantity or
amount of dollar loss or psychological injury inflicted on the
victim. This information is of great significance in cases where
a defendant has pled guilty instead of electing a trial because
the judge hears only the limited facts elicited from a defendant
to satisfy the factual basis requirement of the Rule 11 guilty
175
plea.
Using the Guidelines Statutory Index, the probation officer
initially must assess the "base level" of a given offense in order
to select a baseline sentencing range. That base offense-level
will also reflect the defendant's prior convictions, placing the
defendant in one of six criminal history categories. This information translates to a box on the sentencing range and, in
turn, reveals the offender's potential eligibility for a non-custody sentence.176 The probation officer also must provide information regarding additional adjustments to the offense level

Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the federal
judge to obtain a factual basis for guilt relating to the crime to which the defendant pleads. If a defendant has entered a plea of guilty to one of multiple counts
charged by the government pursuant to a plea agreement, the judge will require
only the minimal recitation of facts sufficient to accept the guilty plea. Yet under
the Guidelines structure, the bigger factual picture is also relevant for sentencing
purposes and will be described in some detail in the PSI. Defense counsel might
question the relative merit of pleading guilty to one count only to defer debate
about the "real facts" of the crime to the sentencing phase. Often defense counsel
is frustrated when the PSI writer seemingly adopts wholesale the prosecution's
view of the strength of all the charges against the defendant. Defense counsel
often yearns to go to trial just to prove the prosecution's lack of evidence regarding other counts to which the defendant did not plead guilty. Thus, the recurring
complaint that PSI writers, not being lawyers, cannot appreciate the weakness in
the proof of the counts charged in the indictment leads some defense attorneys to
an acrimonious, combative relationship with the probation officer. One district
within the Second Circuit has a Probation Office where all presentence writers are
lawyers. Telephone interview with James Dean, Chief Deputy Probation Officer,
Vermont (July 1, 1993).
For a thoughtful discussion of the due process disadvantages present in the
Guidelines structure, see Professor Susan N. Herman's article, The Tail That
Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Limits of Due Process. 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 289 (1992).
16 The Guidelines Sentencing Table permits eligibility for a probation sentence
for a first time offender whose crimes fall within the first 10 levels (6-12 months
maximum). A "split sentence"-part custody and part probation-is only available
if a first-time offender's base offense-level falls within level 12 or below (10-16
months maximum). See U.S.S.G. §§ 5B1.1(a)(1)-(2), 5C1.1(c)(3), .1(d)(2).
1'
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such as a defendant's role in the offense and whether or not
she obstructed justice. If a defendant "accepts responsibility"
for the offense, a downward adjustment of two levels is generally awarded. 17 7 The act of pleading guilty, however, does not
necessarily ensure acceptance of responsibility credit as the
probation officer may conclude that a particular defendant does
not personally admit to the magnitude of the wrongdoing involved in the offense charged or the alleged "relevant conduct
related to it." 178 The PSI writer will also solicit the defense's

version of the facts. 7 ' The probation office will routinely include some personal history information about the defendant
in the PSI, including employment history, family members and
the defendant's accomplishments. Such information is somewhat gratuitous for Guidelines sentencing purposes other than
as argument for a lenient lower-end sentence within the designated Guidelines range. It is critical, however, for purposes of
a section 5H1.6 downward departure. 8 '
1- Id. § 5K2.16.
178 Relevant conduct includes the events surrounding the charged crime and
other uncharged criminal activity allegedly attributable to the defendant. The
Guidelines, effective as amended November 1992, restrict relevant conduct to reasonably foreseeable acts done by criminal associates in joint activities. Relevant
conduct assessments can loom quite large in determining the appropriate sentencing range and can negate any benefits of pleading guilty to only certain charges of
the indictment. See id. § 1B1.3(a).
"' As a general practice, in the Guidelines era defense counsel attends the
presentence interview with the probation officer. In the pre-Guidelines era, defense
counsel's only worry was that clients might not express sufficient remorse for their
crimes and thereby receive a poor sentencing evaluation from the probation officers. Now, however, defense counsel is very cautious about allowing a defendant to
speak with the probation officer, because too often a defendant may unwittingly
finalize information that has dire consequences under the Guidelines. The "gagging" of the defendant often imposed by defense counsel's presence adds to the
tension between the probation officer and the defense counsel.
18 A comparison of pre-Guidelines and post-Guidelines PSI reflects the difference in sentencing approaches. The pre-Guidelines PSI contained extensive information on the life history of the defendant, including employment history, educational background and general accomplishments. Guidelines PSIs generally contain
less background information. A most telling difference in the two styles of PSI is
the presence of a mathematical calculation that runs throughout the Guidelines
report. A tally of criminal offense "points" is made, substraction or addition is performed upon the "base level" calculation and, ultimately, some offense level and
criminal history category is reached. At the end of this mathematical reckoning,
the defendant receives a number and collects his "price" at the sentencing hearing.
The theme of converting human events to mathematical numbers in order to evaluate the defendant's crime and appropriate punishment can lead probation profes-
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In addition to the descriptive and mathematical components, the PSI includes a recommendation section. The Guidelines, however, greatly restrict the sentencing options that can
be recommended by the PSI writer. Sentencing options other
than prison are impossible even for a nonviolent, first-time
offender if the offense committed is assigned a base level above
the levels where probation or home detention are available as
punishment options. 8 ' This restriction on sentencing alternatives hampers the probation officer's ability to recommend
sentencing solutions that might be most responsive to the
particular defendant's situation.
Survey participants expressed some frustration that the
Guidelines structure had too few sentencing options available
for the nonviolent, first offender. Specifically, monitored home
detention was seen as a preferred viable alternative sentence
for certain first or even second time nonviolent offenders.'82
It was also suggested by respondents that since the prison
population has greatly increased, the Guidelines should be
changed to allow for alternatives to incarceration for first time
nonviolent offenders.' 83 A good illustration of the way the

sionals to feel like tax assessors levying sentencing penalties. This dehumanizing
effect is seen in the Guidelines' format.
' See, e.g., supra note 176 and accompanying text.
' After attending the June 1993 United States Sentencing Commission Drugs
& Violence in America Symposium, both Maria McBride, Chief U.S. Probation
Officer, Connecticut, and James Dean, Chief U.S. Probation Officer, Vermont, independently spoke of their perception that there is a change in attitudes toward
sentencing. The focus in sentencing seems to be shifting from incarceration to
rehabilitation and the possibility of alternative sentencing. Although it is unlikely
that the mandatory minimums will be repealed outright in the near future, there
was a consensus at the Symposium that the minimums are not producing the
desired results and in fact are unjust m application.
Respondents answered the questions:
17) To what degree are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines flexible enough
to allow a defendant to qualify for appropriate alternative types of sentencing (e.g., home detention).
a) moderately flexible
b) sufficiently flexible
c) very flexible
d) insufficiently flexible
18) In what specific circumstances or situations, not covered by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, should a defendant be eligible to qualify for
home detention?
Anonymous Survey Question Nos. 17, 18.
Generally the responses were in the "sufficiently flexible to moderately flexi-
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Guidelines' calculation structure restricts consideration of
sentencing options even for a first-time offender is the crime of
embezzlement. Guidelines section 2B1.1 states that a crime of
embezzlement earns a base level of "4' (zero to six
months)." If the loss is more than $100, the base level increases in designated increments." 5 If a defendant were to
embezzle $70,000, such an amount would warrant a 7-level
increase above the base level to level 11 (eight to fourteen
months). Moreover, if this embezzlement required more than
"minimal planning," such as one committed over a period of
time, an additional increase of 2 levels is permitted."8 6 If sentenced at level 13 (twelve to eighteen months), 8 7 the defendant would be ineligible for probation even as a nonviolent
first offender. The Guidelines' treatment of embezzlement is of
particular note for the female offender. Of the 31 categories of
offense outcomes annually tallied in the 1990-1992 United
States Sentencing Commission Annual Reports, embezzlement
is the only federal crime in which females constitute the most
likely offenders. In 1992, female offenders constituted 58.6% of
all reported federal embezzlement convictions.'8 8
It is significant that in 1990, female offenders constituted
54.5% of the embezzlement convictions nationwide. In 1990,
federal judges also reported that the primary reason they had
granted downward departures in embezzlement cases was
because of "family responsibilities."'89 The combination of

ble" range.
Some respondents did offer the suggestion that nonviolent first offenders with
health concerns or significant family responsibilities should be eligible for alternative sentencing options such as home detention.
1- U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.
185 Id.
186 Id.

187Id.
1" 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 48 (Table 13) (Gender of Defendant
by Primary Offense Category) (covering October 1-September 30, 1992). Of the 1186
embezzlement offenses, 491 (41.4%) were committed by males and 695 (58.6%)
were committed by females. Id.
Of the 1134 embezzlement offenses, 60.9% were committed by females while
39.2% were committed by males. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 55 (Table 17) (October 1990 - September 30, 1991).
1" According to the 1990 Annual Report, of the 6144 total embezzlement offenses, 521 (45.5%) were committed by males and 623 (54.5%) were committed by
females. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 45 (Table G) (Embezzlement)
(covering Oct. 1, 1989-Sept. 30, 1990). Of the reasons most frequently given for
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these two statistics strongly suggests that in the crime category where federal judges are most likely to encounter female
offenders, judges needed to resort to a downward departure
below the applicable Guidelines range in order to arrive at a
sentence that seemed appropriate to the defendant's situation. 9 ' The restrictive Guidelines approach to probation eligibility is significant because of the parsimony rule found in 18
U.S.C. section 3553(a) that "[tlhe court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with purposes set forth" in that subsection. 9 ' If the probation officers
and the federal judiciary have both concluded that probation is
preferable for these nonviolent offenders, then the Guidelines
should be modified to reflect this empirical data.'92
Far and away the greatest impediment to the presentation
of appropriate sentencing options according to Survey respondents is the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme. Survey
respondents emphasized that mandatory minimum statutory
requirements negatively impacted their ability to propose viable sentencing options and resulted in sentencing disparity.'93

departures when the crime implicated the primary offense categories, family ties
and responsibilities constituted 28.6%; substantial assistance constituted 21.4% of
the total number of departures. See id. at 75 (Table T).
In the other categories of federal offenses that year, substantial assistance
was the most frequent reason given for a downward departure.
" This sentencing pattern is entirely consistent with the Survey respondents
observation that the Guidelines' mathematical formula may be unrealistic in its
results and, thereby, does not allow judges sufficient latitude to craft appropriate
sentences for the typical first-time, nonviolent offender.
'1 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1992).
"9 Although theoretically the Guidelines allow for use of "downward departures"
where appropriate in order to adjust the punishment to the offender, this approach
requires the probation officer and, in turn, the judge to couch the departure in
terms of "extraordinary" circumstances where in fact the opposite may be
true-the offender is typical of the offenders who commit this crime because the
"typical" offender has family responsibilities and has been law-abiding throughout
her life. The real problem may be the unrealistic punishment scheme devised by
the mathematical approach of the Guidelines themselves. As Dale G. Parent observed:
The primary reason for departures is to achieve more proportional punishments for the small number of exceptional cases that do not fit into
the general norms embodied in the guidelines and therefore require sentences outside the usual range. Departures were never intended to be a
mechanism for fundamentally revising sentencing guidelines.
What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE L.J. 172
(1992).
'" Mandatory minimum sentences are drug-offense statutes, which require that
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Furthermore, some respondents were particularly troubled by
the capricious, heartbreaking effect of mandatory minimum
statutes in drug conspiracies where low level conspirators
receive the mandatory minimum while higher-ranking and
more culpable co-conspirators serve less time because they
have provided information of value to the government."' As
the probation officers who prepare PSIs, Survey respondents
expressed a feeling of futility in situations where the mandatory minimum statutory provision controls the sentence outcome
so that virtually no information about a worthy offender or her
marginal role in the case has any bearing on the sentence that
must be imposed by law.195
The PSI, however, does differentiate between the probation officer's sentence recommendation and the officer's identification of possible grounds for departure. A separate section in

a prescribed minimum sentence be imposed unless the government makes a motion to sentence below the statutory minimum. The Survey respondents mentioned
mandatory-minimum sentences and § 5K1. substantial assistance motions in response to the question regarding whether disparity under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines persists. See, e.g., Anonymous Survey No. 44.
.. Professors Nagel and Schulhofer noted the sentencing disparity created by
mandatory minimum sentences in the Guidelines scheme:
So long as mandatory minimum sentences, and guidelines anchored by
mandatory minimums, are tied to the charges for which the defendant is
convicted and prosecutors exercise unfettered discretion in charging decisions, the goals of certainty, uniformity, and the reduction of unwarranted disparity are at risk. At a time when the federal caseload is increasingly dominated by dug cases, the problem cannot be ignored. The problem can be managed and circumscribed through a guideline system; it
appears insoluble in a system governed by mandatory minimums tied to
the charges for which defendants are convicted.
Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 561.
" One survey respondent commented:
However, it must be pointed out that there are certain disparities that
cannot be remedied by the guidelines. I refer specifically to the case of
mandatory statutory minimums. I was personally involved in a case
where a young woman who was barely involved in a drug transaction by
virtue of having accompanied her boyfriend to a drop off, received the
same mandatory minimum of 10 years as he did. On the other hand, the
confidential informant, a big, notorious drug dealer, received no sentence
at all.
Anonymous Survey No. 79.
Maria McBride, Chief Probation Officer, Connecticut, shares this distaste for
the mandatory minimums, particularly their effect on multiple defendant conspiracy cases. "The big fish, who can give substantial assistance because of his or her
greater culpability often receives a lesser sentence than a less culpable defendant."
Interview with Maria Mcbride, Chief Probation Officer, Connecticut (July 6, 1993).
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the standard PSI is set aside for such factors, accompanied by
the caveat that information contained in that section does not
necessarily constitute the probation officer's actual recommendation for a departure. This PSI section thereby serves notice
on the court and all counsel that the PSI writer is at least
aware of the existence of these factors, whether or not they are
reflected in the ultimate sentence recommendation. This, in
turn, allows the court and advocates to argue for or against the
departures based upon these factors. Defense counsel is encouraged to communicate any mitigating factors to the PSI
writers for inclusion in the report,'9 6 but this decision is a
strategic one. Although inclusion of these mitigating factors in
the PSI report could result in persuading the Probation Office
to support a downward departure, inclusion could also detract
from the possible sympathetic impact upon the judge if the
Probation Office and the prosecutor have ample time to defeat
the departure theory. Of course, the PSI writer may simply be
neutral regarding the wisdom of the departure theory and
remove himself or herself from the debate. The PSI is submitted to the court at least ten days before the sentencing date
with copies disclosed to the prosecution and defense. Both
advocates can file any objections to the PSI with the Probation
Office and the court. The PSI writer considers these objections
and then formally responds by rejecting the contentions or
modifying the PSI calculations in a supplemental report.
Thus, through the PSI Guidelines assessment and the
responses to that assessment filed by the advocates, the sentencing court will be alerted to any possible contested sentencing issues at the sentencing hearing. Since the PSI involves
interpretations of Guidelines policies and commentary, the PSI
writer plays a critical role in shaping how the court initially
views the facts for sentencing purposes.
B. Attitudes RegardingDownward Departures
Although Survey respondents were somewhat frustrated
that they could not always offer sentencing options that fit the
offenders' needs, the overwhelming majority of respondents
viewed the PSI as very important in determining the ultimate
1"J See Garoppolo, supra note 166, at 302.
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sentence imposed; only one respondent viewed it as not important in the sentencing outcome. Respondents also acknowledged that the PSI had a significant effect on a defendant's life
after incarceration.
While the amount of initial training time required to learn
record-gathering and interviewing skills varied, Survey respondents described the degree of initial training in the area of
identification of downward departures as only "moderate" or
"somewhat" adequate. Only two respondents felt "thoroughly"
prepared through initial training to identify bases of downward
departures. 9 7 Given the focus of Johnson upon the "extraordinary" family ties and circumstances that would warrant a
court to depart downward, the Survey addressed the
respondent's familiarity with offender characteristics which
might constitute departure factors. Survey respondents provided noteworthy anecdotal experiences in this downward departure area. Most respondents learned of possible downward
departures factors from defense counsel either "often" or
"sometimes," whereas not surprisingly they rarely learned of
downward departure bases from the government. Sometimes
prosecutors did communicate a basis for a downward departure, but those occasions usually related to a defendant's coop-

19 Respondents also remarked:

"Departures, particularly searching for creative departures was not part of
training." Anonymous Survey No. 123. Respondents noted as well that time on the
job and additional training has resulted in improved identification skills: "As the
PSI writer continues to write PSI's after training, he/she learns through exposure
the identification of applicable downward departures." Anonymous Survey No. 35.
"Improved in the sense that as more grounds are recognized by the courts, the
more options for departures we can suggest." Anonymous Survey No. 78.
Interestingly, when asked to describe the degree to which the Guidelines
scheme achieves the stated goal of eliminating unwarranted disparity, few respondents judged the Guidelines more than "moderately successful." The Survey respondents remarked that "guidelines are excellent, the use of § 5K departures create
the disparity;" another respondent observed: "the judges continue to downwardly
depart." One respondent shared the following anecdote: "On a visit to the Sentencing Commission, I asked the same question and their response after five years of
Guidelines sentencing was 'We don't know yet.' The respondent expressed disbelief
at this Commission position.
Survey respondents were also asked: "To what degree do you feel plea bargaining practices (e.g., charging decisions, substantial assistance motions by government) in your district create unwarranted sentencing disparity?" Approximately
two-thirds of the respondents described the degree as "somewhat to moderately."
Approximately one third chose "not at all."
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eration.195 Respondents were asked to give examples from
their own experiences for the possible departure categories of
"aberrant behavior" and "extraordinary family circumstances."
Generally their answers reflected interest in the presence of
major health problems in a defendant's family and debilitating
events such as "a parent becomes extremely ill and therefore
the adult child who has no prior criminal history embarks on a
crime spree in order to pay for the parent's medical expenses."'9 9 Sudden loss of long-term employment coupled with
family health crisis was also cited by respondents as a circumstance that might warrant sentencing leniency."0
A defendant's child-rearing responsibilities where no other
family member could care for infirm, young or elderly family
members was the predominant example of "extraordinary fami" "' Some respondents, however, had reserly
circumstances.
vations
about applying
the "extraordinary family responsibili-

' Significantly, a minority of respondents stated that they rarely or never
learn of a basis for downward departure from defense counsel; almost half the
respondents stated that they had never learned of a downward departure from a
case agent.
' Respondents stated that they would also consider the impact of incarceration
on people close to the defendant. They considered whether the defendant had even
been in trouble before. Specific anecdotal cases presented included a "[1]ongtime
bank employee with good work record blatantly took cash and drove around the
country for about two weeks after her husband left her. She surrendered voluntarily." Anonymous Survey No. 107. Another anecdote described a law-abiding bank
teller in her late thirties who became involved with a check-kiting scheme because
the family fell behind in its bills due to the erratic manner in which her husband
was paid in his business. Anonymous Survey No. 79.
" "Sudden loss of job" was usually considered important if the offender previously had been "law-abiding." This sudden change in financial security was seen
as a credible "trigger" for aberrant behavior among offenders who commit nonviolent property crimes.
201 Anecdotal Survey responses included:
1)
"The defendant was the sole source of support for a 9-year old nephew . . . [whose] mother died of cancer, his father was uninterested, and his grandparents (The defendant's parents) committed suicide." Anonymous Survey No. 37.
2) "Child with life threatening illness (father not responsible). Defendant
uniquely capable (among co-defendants) of making restitution." Anonymous Survey
No. 108.
3) "Sudden loss or incapacitation of a family member due to illness, accident, or violence; e.g., a mother of two lost her husband to a sudden illness and
was also laid off from her employment. Her mortgage was foreclosed. She was
offered the opportunity to smuggle on one occasion." Anonymous Survey No. 107.
4) "Obedient wife (Latin custom outside U.S.) does what her husband demands." Anonymous Surney No. 39.
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ties" depaiture theory. They reported that they would examine
the situation very carefully to determine whether there was an
"able guardian" available to care for very young or aging dependents. One respondent commented, "Personally, I may
bring this fact to the court's attention, however, I feel that the
defendants did not consider these factors when committing the
crime; should we place more weight on them?"2 ' Another respondent remarked, "Some consideration is given, however,
even in pre-[G]uidelines practice, dependents were not viewed
as a reason to 'excuse' the defendant from the personal consequences of his behavior. Appropriate agencies are normally
notified by the United States Probation Officer... .))23 Similarly, another respondent echoed the belief that social agencies
will assist with defendant's very young or elderly dependents:
[Ihf the child is very young or if there are elderly parents in our city
should not matter. There are numerous social service agencies which
can and will provide for the family while the defendant is incarcerated. It is just a matter of how hard the probation officer can/wants
to work in order to ascertain the needed information for Federal
agencies." 4

When asked to what degree being a single parent with
minor children would be significant in evaluating a defendant's
family responsibilities where the other parent is unwilling or
unable to care for the children, the majority of respondents
stated that such a fact would be "highly" or "moderately" significant."5 Respondents also expressed the following opinions: "I would consider the welfare of the dependant/minor
child, however, there are other means/agencies which deal with
this issue. Personally, depending on the individual case, the
20 6
minor children may be in better hands in such an agency."

20 Anonymous Survey No. 126.
20 Anonymous Survey No. 107.
204 Some respondents expressed the belief that the presence of very young or
elderly dependents in the defendant's home "was a hardship, but not an extraordinary hardship." Other respondents noted the Guidelines' position: "While under the
Guidelines, family responsibility is not ordinarily relevant, the key word here is
ordinary. There may be extraordinary circumstances which constitute significant
factors." Anonymous Survey No. 79.
20 Eight respondents indicated "highly" or "moderately." Seven respondents
chose "somewhat significant" as an answer. Three respondents indicated "not at all
significant" and two respondents chose "other/explain."

20 Anonymous Survey No. 126.
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Another respondent observed, "Naturally, you don't want to
send a recovering (abstinent) drug abuser away to prison if she
is a single mother of a young 3-11 year old child; if the addict
is using drugs, then it may be in the best interest of both parties. 207
When asked if it would make a difference if the single
parent is a mother or a father, the overwhelming majority of
respondents said that it would not make a difference. 0 ' For
the majority of the respondents, this was a hypothetical question because they had rarely, if ever, dealt with a single father
with dependent children. One respondent, however, had encountered a male grandparent in a kinship foster-care situa-

tion. The respondents also reported that it would not make a
difference in their evaluation whether both parents were present in the home and the defendant-mother faced incarceration.2 ' The majority of respondents also stated that they
made home visits in connection with their investigation of the
defendant's personal history.210
When respondents were also asked if there were any as-

pects of a defendant's personal history that should be considered in the Guidelines scheme, most answered in the negative
with the following exceptions: "Most personal history is irrelevant to [Gluidelines computations, however, adequate departures already exist to address serious personal history problems."2 1 Those respondents who did believe that some, as yet
unused, aspects of personal history should be considered, ofThree respondents indicated that the single parent status was "not at all
significant" in their evaluation. Anonymous Surveys Nos. 102, 104 & 134. Another
respondent stated that the significance of this factor would "depend[l on how big a
departure" was needed. Anonymous Survey No. 125. When asked how interested
the average district court judge was in the consequences of parental removal from
the home if the defendant parent is incarcerated, most respondents stated "somewhat" concerned or "very dependent" on the particular judge. Only one respondent
indicated this fact was "not a consideration" for the average judge. Anonymous
Survey No. 104.
...Respondents remarked, "Itihe impact upon the child is the same, regardless
of the sex of the parent," Anonymous Survey No. 39, and "[tihe remaining parent
is a "focus" of the dependent regardless of gender, except in the case of very
young ("pre-school") age children," Anonymous Survey No. 107.
" Sixteen respondents indicated "no difference," while five indicated "some difference."
210 Respondents also reported contacting siblings, parents and children of the
defendants.
2'1

21, Anonymous Survey No. 35.
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fered "family background/history, education, work/employment
history" as examples.2 12 Other respondents addressed the
problem with section 5H1 policy statements: "More emphasis
and direction should be given regarding extraordinary personal
circumstances particularly relating to the person's background
or upbringing."2 13 One respondent challenged the limitation
found in section 5H1: "U.S.S.G. [Section] 5H1.12-factors in the
upbringing should be considered for offenders in the 18-25 age
bracket formerly covered by FCYA."1 4 "Many of the departures listed by the Sentencing Commission as 'not ordinarily
relevant' ought to be relevant: [sections] 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.6,
5H1.11, and successful rehabilitation after the time of the
offense which has been upheld is now taking a beating in some
districts."2 1 Another respondent observed:
Actually the judges can depart almost any time they wish because
the Guidelines give them the authority when circumstances exist of
a kind not adequately taken into consideration by the U.S.S.G.
Well-that's awfully broad. In reality, the judges don't feel comfortable departing. If the U.S.S.G. wanted the judges to have this broad
discretion, then why have such structured guidelines?..6

Respondents were asked if they had encountered any examples of significant mental or physical disabilities that would
warrant a downward departure. Although several respondents
remarked that they had never encountered such disabilities,
the majority of responses focused on AIDS or HIV-positive
situations.2 17 Other comments indicated that cancer, serious
cardiac conditions, juvenile (insulin-dependent) diabetes and
mental illness2"' could be, or have been, bases for downward
212 Anonymous Survey No. 128.
213 Anonymous Survey No. 37.
214 Anonymous Survey No. 107.

Anonymous Survey No. 97.

216 Anonymous Survey No. 120.
217 The Survey responses included

the following:.
* "severe mental deviant behavior which requires hospitalization ...
full
blown AIDS--death imminent" (Anonymous Survey No. 39);
- "defendant was HIV positive and extended incarceration would negatively
impact upon his health" (Anonymous Survey No. 54);
' "defendant suffering from a terminal illness" (Anonymous Survey No. 108).
218 Respondents offered the following examples:
* "[t]he defendant had a history of mental illness. When he took this medication, he was fine. But when he stopped taking his medication, he began committing ridiculous crimes" (Anonymous Survey No. 37);
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departures.
The range of Survey responses regarding which offender
characteristics and personal circumstances warrant consideration as bases for downward departures highlights the problem
inherent in the Guidelines structure. Presentence investigators
are themselves unclear as to which factors should be treated as
a basis for the downward departure. At the heart of the problem is the difficulty of defining what exactly is "ordinary." The
respondents who were able to offer examples of "aberrant"
criminal behavior seemed implicitly to presume that these
defendants were "acting out" criminally because of the extreme
pressure put on them arising out of "extraordinary" misfortune, whether economic, psychological or health-related. Thus,
it would appear from the responses that while "ordinary"
should encompass the ordinary vicissitudes of life, overwhelming obstacles dramatically change that equation. If some as yet
unspecified amount of misfortune is visited upon an "ordinary"
individual, and she succumbs to criminality as a response,
then it appears that some judicial lenity may be appropriate. A
Job-like response is not expected by at least some probation
officers as the ordinary reaction to such extraordinary stress.
The Guidelines, however, do not address why individuals
choose criminality; the Guidelines focus primarily on what
form of criminality they choose and on how to ensure that all
similarly situated offenders receive like punishment. Such an
approach, however, begs the question the sentencing court
must address: is the punishment actually the same if the impact of the punishment upon the offender has very different
consequences?
Having taken no position in the Guidelines on the purposes of sentencing in general, the Commission leaves to courts
and probation officers the task of identifying "atypical" offender situations. The question that remains unanswered by this
approach is whether the reason an offender resorts to crime in
some way lessens or enhances culpability which, after all, is

* "defendant alcoholic/professional gambler/psychiatrically impaired/long time
participant in psychotherapy/incorrect understanding of the law (lesser harms)
intent of U.S.S.G" (Anonymous Survey No. 108);
* "Post-traumatic stress syndrome" (Anonymous Survey No. 107);
"[individuals with extensive psychiatric history and several cases with
Vietnam veterans who suffer post-war effects" (Anonymous Survey No. 78).
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the trait the Guidelines seek to measure. The Survey
respondents' anecdotal examples seem consistent with the
premise that culpability is somehow aggravated or mitigated.
The sentencing goal of deterrence is arguably affected by the
offender's motivation in resorting to crime. For the offender
who resorts to crime due to aberrant circumstances, crime is
"out of character," and, as a result, there is less probability of
deterring such an individual. The offender's criminal act is an
outgrowth of unusual pressure or stress, not greed or ennui;
the crime appears to be a response to an unusual situation, not
a character flaw. The Survey respondents suggest that while
the probation investigators expect that "ordinary" mature people will withstand "ordinary" misfortune, they recognize the
fragility of the human spirit when it is overwhelmed.
It is significant that a common example from the Survey
responses of the "out-of-the-ordinary" pressure imposed by
modern living upon ordinary individuals is the current health
care crisis. Survey respondents mirrored the greater society's
recognition of the crippling social, financial and emotional
burden that the American health care situation creates. The
Survey responses suggest that an offender's decision to commit
nonviolent crimes in such a situation may be understandable,
although not excusable, and therefore may be worthy of downward departure consideration. The probation officers who responded revealed a sensitivity to the broad range of factors in
modern living that temporarily could alter a law-abiding
person's judgment, causing such a person to commit crimes.
With the widespread occurrence of AIDS, it came as little surprise to see Survey respondents from at least two districts
question the wisdom of incarcerating someone whose fate is
sealed by a source other than the sentencing judge. Some other
health considerations taken into account by respondents concern mental or emotional health problems that are both significant and recognizable: "post-traumatic stress syndrome," often
suffered by Vietnam veterans; "extensive psychiatric history;"
and addictions to drugs, alcohol or gambling that rise to the
level of extenuating circumstances that sentencing court
should consider in arriving at a sentence.
The responses also make clear that identification of downward departures is a value-laden experience. Presentence
investigators' perceptions about what is ordinary, what is toler-
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able misfortune for a mature adult to handle and what is "extraordinary" will control the way facts are presented to a sentencing court. Disapproval of, or empathy for, the offenders'
predicament will enter the assessment process. Moreover,
there is no agreement other than at the extreme end of the
spectrum as to what constitutes "extraordinary" circumstances.
Case law concluding that a defendant's situation was extraordinary can assist the evaluative process, but only if a sufficient
description is given. A case in point is United States v. Johnson.219 While many respondents were aware that extraordinary child-care responsibilities could constitute grounds for a
downward departure, there was some resistance to this basis
for departure, and arguably a presentence investigator holding
such a point of view would set an exceptionally high standard
for the type of circumstances that should be viewed as extraordinary. Cultural and gender factors may also interfere with the
downward departure evaluative process. A male defendant
may not emphasize or even mention the degree to which he
functions as the "care-giver" in the family unit. Instead, he
may describe himself in the more traditional role of "breadwinner," which is less compelling rhetorically. While the defendants in Johnson"' and United States v. Alba 22 ' were working parents or "breadwinners," they were described in their
extensive care-giving roles as well. The district courts, presented with these facts, found each defendant was the linchpin of
the family unit. If a defendant provides economic support to
the family, such a circumstance, standing alone, would not
appear to be compelling enough for a departure. It remains to
be seen as well whether a defendant who does not live with his
or her children but provides regular emotional support or guidance could even qualify for a section 5H1.6 downward departure. For now, though, it appears that the only acceptable
family model is the parent-child, close-knit living arrangement.222 Yet if the PSI writer does not perceive a family situ964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id.
221 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991).
22 United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1993), suggests that the
emphasis may very well be shifting from the stricter parent-child model to the
"extended care-giver" or emotional linchpin model. Defendant Sclamo was living
with his girlfriend and her two children. Although Sclamo was neither the natural
219
220
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ation as one in which the defendant is a readily identifiable
care-giver, and the defendant does not report himself to be one,
the PSI writer may well overlook eligibility of the defendant-especially the male defendant-for a downward departure under section 5H1.6. Thus, even in the Second Circuit
there is no safeguard to ensure that all potentially eligible
defendants will be scrutinized by the same standard to qualify
for the "family responsibility" downward departure. 3
CONCLUSION

In United States v. Johnson, the Second Circuit reached a
predictable result in view of that court's approach to the
Guidelines. Its holding nonetheless reinforces an important
point in the evolving Second Circuit downward-departure jurisprudence. District courts have received a clear signal that the
father, nor the legal stepfather to the children, he developed a "special and crucially important relationship with the twelve year old son, James." Id. at 72.
James had emotional and psychological problems sufficiently severe to warrant

extensive psychological counseling. Two letters from the boy's psychologist documented the improvement in the boy and attributed some of this improvement to
Sclamo in his voluntary role as stepfather. The psychologist also warned that
Sclamo's "removal from the family could rob all [family] members of a critical
source of affection and positive care and clinically could trigger a major regression
in James' stability and emotional development." Id.
The Court found it significant that the psychologist's reports were "based on a
long history of personal observation, interaction, and treatment not only of James
but of the defendant as well .

. . ."

which long predated the defendant's present

circumstances. Sclamo, 997 F.2d at 974. The First Circuit agreed with the "district
court's conclusion that the psychological treatment and observation of James were
not contrived or fabricated to assist Sclamo." Id. Relying on United States v.
Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993), United States v. Pefia, 930 F.2d 1486, 1495
(10th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992),
the court saw a number of special factors that "transform[ed] Sclamo's situation
into an extraordinary one meriting the downward departure." Sclamo, 997 F.2d at
974. Thus, Sclamo, along with Johnson, Pefla and Rivera, strongly suggest that
while "breadwinning" does not necessarily merit a downward departure, care-giving
might.
22 Some supervising probation
officers make a special point of affirmatively
asking if a basis for a downward departure is present. Maria McBride, Chief Deputy Probation Officer Connecticut in a June 1993 phone interview, stated that in
Connecticut "[wie insist officers find a basis for departures. If there are no possible reasons for a departure on the PSI, I ask, 'why not?' Telephone Interview
with Maria McBride, Chief Deputy Probation Officer in Connecticut (June 1993).
Ms. McBride views part of the probation officers' job as providing "reasons for
judges." Defendants are on more equal footing if the probation officers take it
upon themselves to investigate affirmatively a basis for downward departures.
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"coast is clear" in the Second Circuit for the use of certain
"extraordinary" offender characteristics as bases of downward
departures, even when the "extraordinary" nature of the
offender's circumstances is seen primarily in the eyes of the
district court. The Second Circuit made it clear that it would
not thwart a district court's efforts to perform a task that it is
much better suited than the Commission to perform-that is,
select the appropriate sentence for the particular offender
standing before it. Therefore, the Second Circuit chose to second-guess the Commission's Guidelines rather than the district
court's perceptions of the extraordinary nature of an offender's
circumstances.
Although the Commission ostensibly welcomes the empirical data generated by judicial downward departure patterns,
few circuit courts until Johnson had allowed district courts to
deviate from the Guidelines as readily as the Second Circuit
has. While nominally adhering to the Guidelines' sentencing
mechanism, the Second Circuit has been quick to conclude that
the Commission had not adequately considered a particular
offender characteristic and, therefore, that the district court
should not feel constrained by the Guidelines when factoring in
that circumstance for sentencing purposes. With unwavering
confidence, the Second Circuit has established an outpost on
the Guidelines downward-departure frontier and has broadcast
its messages back to the Commission as requested. It appears,
however, that the messages have been garbled in transmission
because the Commission viewed Johnson as a case of "atypical
circumstances involving offender characteristics." Yet if Johnson is treated as an "atypical" case, then its message concerning the importance of treating the nonviolent offender's family
responsibilities with compassion will not impact the
Commission's data collection and evaluation as it should.
The precedent established in the 1992 Johnson case has
caused some apparent rethinking of § 5H1.6 policy statement
in other circuits. Both the Third Circuit in United States v.
Gaskil224 and the First Circuit in United States v. Rivera"

991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993).
Both Rivera and Sclamo owe a debt to Johnson's ground-breaking effort to
broaden the court's perspective in considering those, other than just the defendant,
who will be irrevocably affected by the sentence.
'4
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have retreated from their previous disapproving interpretation
of § 5H1.6 downward departures based upon family responsibilities and instead have adopted a philosophical approach in
greater alignment with the Second Circuit's position in Johnson."6 The First Circuit reflected this philosophical change in
United States v. Rivera when it observed:
It may not be unusual, for example, to find that a convicted drug
offender is a single mother with family responsibilities, but at some
point, the nature and magnitude of family responsibilities (many
children? with handicaps? no money? no place for children to go?)
may transform the "ordinary" case of such circumstances into a case
that is not at all ordinary.227

While expansion of the possible factors that may constitute
"not ordinary" family responsibilities is encouraging, the federal judiciary must continue to find principled ways to assess
"extraordinary" circumstances. Factual detail supporting the
downward departure conclusion reached by a court should be
clear in the record so that future PSI writers, defense counsel
and judges will be able to identify "extraordinary" personal
history factors that should bear upon the sentencing outcome.
Circuit courts should be deferential to a district court's downward departure findings and remand for additional findings
but should not reverse hastily if the record does not contain
sufficient information to explain the sentencing court's § 5H1.6
downward departure decision. The message sent by the Second
Circuit in Johnson will continue to reverberate throughout the
neighboring circuits and will make attainment of the "extraordinary" family responsibilities downward departure easier for
the deserving nonviolent offender in the Second Circuit.

964 F.2d at 124.
994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993). One month following Rivera the first
Circuit, in United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1993), found emotional
and psychological care-giving by a non-biological parent to be an acceptable basis
for a downward departure. The court considered the potential destruction, both
emotionally and psychologically, of a twelve-year-old boy if the defendant were to
be removed from the home for an extended period of time.
2''
"

